

Supplementary Files

A Survey Experiment

In the main text, we describe results from a survey experiment that provided real information about India's response to a natural disaster to American citizens. In this section, we present additional detail on the survey reported in the main text as well as related analysis and alternative versions of the survey.

A.1 Full Treatment Text for Main Survey

Both our treatment and control texts were borrowed from news reports, so individuals were aware that these events actually occurred. The scenario, with the treatment text in bold, read:

On the next page, you will be asked to read about a real news event that happened a few years ago. You will read about a situation that many countries have faced and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe the approach leaders took in this instance and ask you for your views. Please read the scenario and imagine how you would feel if these events were happening today.

South Asia's strongest earthquake on Oct. 8, 2005 killed around 75,000 people and left up to 3.5 million homeless in northern Pakistan and India. Many concrete-roofed buildings, including most government offices and schools, collapsed in the quake, burying thousands of people under rubble. According to the U.N. Children's Fund, the earthquake damaged or destroyed almost 10,000 schools and three-quarters of health facilities. In India, the quake killed just over 1,300 people and left more than 6,600 homeless.

India did not ask for outside assistance. The government announced that it did not need international aid to recover.

A.2 Supplementary Analysis for Main Survey

The average respondent in our sample held a two-year college degree and received an annual income of about \$40,000. Our sample was balanced on gender and political party affiliation, although whites were over-represented (82 percent).

Our tests of balance, depicted in Table 1, provide support for the hypothesis that randomization was successful. Table 2 reports the effects of treatment on all outcome measures.

We perform a mediation analysis to quantify the proportion of the effect of treatment on status that is transmitted through improving individuals' confidence in India's self-sufficiency. The results appear in Table 3. We find that the Average Causally Mediated Effect (ACME) is large and statistically significant, and about two-thirds of our observed effect may be attributed to this perception of self-sufficiency. While these results certainly support our claims, we offer a few points of caution. One concern with this type of analysis is that the results may exaggerate the role of the

Table 1: Descriptive statistics and test of balance

	Treatment		Control		Difference		N
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Difference	SE	N
Age	35.28	10.91	35.49	11.33	-0.21	0.81	758
Male	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	-0.01	0.04	758
Edu (1-8)	4.24	1.40	4.20	1.39	0.05	0.10	758
Income (1-9)	3.85	2.45	3.95	2.47	-0.10	0.18	758
Republican (1-5)	2.48	1.19	2.60	1.18	-0.12	0.09	754
Foreign born (0-1)	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.18	-0.00	0.01	758
Follows news (1-4)	3.22	0.90	3.11	0.97	0.10	0.07	758
Follows intl (0-1)	0.58	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.02	0.04	758

Table 2: All treatment effects of rejection

	Control		No covariates				With background covariates			
	Mean	SD	Coef	SE	p	N	Coef	SE	p	N
Confidence (1-7)	3.86	1.65	0.69	0.12	0.00	758	0.67	0.12	0.00	754
Support (1-7)	4.63	1.35	-0.96	0.12	0.00	758	-0.97	0.12	0.00	754
US opinion (1-3)	2.06	0.48	0.01	0.04	0.88	758	0.01	0.04	0.77	754
Intl opinion (1-3)	2.06	0.53	0.04	0.05	0.35	758	0.05	0.05	0.28	754
Status (1-100)	51.82	22.36	3.58	1.61	0.03	758	3.30	1.65	0.05	754
Ranking (1-7)	3.47	1.14	-0.05	0.08	0.58	758	-0.02	0.09	0.81	754
UNSC (own) (1-7)	4.35	1.42	0.02	0.11	0.87	758	0.00	0.11	0.97	754
UNSC (others) (1-7)	3.89	1.33	0.06	0.10	0.52	758	0.06	0.10	0.55	754
Leader (1-7)	3.83	1.42	0.09	0.10	0.39	758	0.11	0.11	0.31	754

Note: Background covariates include gender, age, education, income, race F.E., state F.E., party ID, frequency of following news, followed international news in last week, born outside the U.S.

mediator if the background causes of the mediator and the outcome are correlated. We quantify this uncertainty in Figure 1, which shows the estimation of the ACME as we vary the correlation between the residuals of our two models. This plot suggests that our estimation of the ACME holds for all cases in which ρ is less than about .1. Finally, we note that while these results are consistent with our theory, the analysis presented here was not submitted as part of the pre-analysis plan we registered in advance of receiving our findings.

A.3 Additional Pre-Registered Analysis for Main Survey

In our pre-analysis plan, we stated that we would investigate the heterogeneous treatment effects of the rejection treatment. We explained:


Although testing this claim is beyond the scope of our project, we believe that the opinions of some populations matter more than others in determining the aggregate/consensus opinion about a country’s status. As such, we look for heterogeneous treatment effects in our data to examine whether our treatment effect is especially strong in the populations we believe are most important for determining status. We look at the treatment effect for two relevant subgroups, which we call elites and monitors. Elites are individuals who have a college education or a household income

Table 3: Treatment effect on status mediated through confidence in India’s ability to handle the disaster

	Estimate	p-value
Avg. Causally Mediated Effect (ACME)	2.16	0.00
Avg. Direct Effect	1.02	0.54
Total Effect	3.18	0.04
Proportion Mediated	0.66	

Note: All results are estimated using the `mediation` package in R. The analysis takes two models – a regression of status on treatment and confidence, and a regression of confidence on treatment – and produces estimates for the mediated, direct, and total effects. (Models used for mediation analysis include our standard set of controls for background covariates.) The ACME refers to the effect of treatment on status that is mediated via confidence; the direct effect refers to the effect of treatment on status that is not mediated via confidence. These sum to the total effect and permit the calculation of the proportion of the effect that is mediated through confidence.

Figure 1: Sensitivity plot for mediation analysis



Note: The parameter ρ refers to the correlation between the residual produced in the regression of the outcome on the mediator and treatment and the residual produced in the regression of the mediator on treatment. In short, it captures the correlation between the background causes of the mediator and the background causes of the outcome.

exceeding 90,000. Monitors are individuals who report having followed international news in the last week. The motivation for focusing on these groups is that we believe elites are likely to have a stronger influence over the media and elites that are relevant for international interactions, and monitors will be the ones most likely to observe countries engaging in the kind of behavior we describe in the treatment. In other words, if a country like India is strategically trying to improve its status, it should focus on changing the opinions of elites and monitors.

Following the model outlined in our plan, we tested for heterogeneous treatment effects of rejection on status and report our results in Table 4. We interact our treatment variable with our subgroup covariate and test for a difference in Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATEs), that is, the difference in treatment effects between elites and non-elites and between monitors and non-monitors. We begin simply by adding our two subgroups, respectively, as control variables. In both Model 2 (elites) and Model 4 (monitors), our aid rejection result stands. When we include the interaction terms in Models 3 and 5, we obtain two CATEs: the sum of the coefficients on rejection and on the interaction term represents the treatment effect for elites/monitors, and the single coefficient on rejection represents the treatment effect for non-elites/non-monitors.

Table 4: Heterogeneous treatment effects (India treatment, US sample)

	Status				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rejection	3.585** (1.607)	3.584** (1.608)	7.547*** (2.358)	3.481** (1.601)	4.468* (2.435)
Elite		-0.091 (1.613)	3.664 (2.295)		
Rejection*Elite			-7.377** (3.217)		
Followed intl				4.264*** (1.616)	5.142** (2.297)
Rejection*Followed intl					-1.740 (3.233)
Constant	51.818*** (1.145)	51.867*** (1.444)	49.824*** (1.693)	49.451*** (1.451)	48.964*** (1.711)
Observations	758	758	758	758	758
R ²	0.007	0.007	0.013	0.016	0.016
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.004	0.010	0.013	0.012

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Contrary to our expectations, we find that for elites, rejection actually has a strongly *negative* effect on status, indicating that our original positive finding is driven mostly by the less affluent and less educated Americans. We test for the significance of the treatment-elite interaction term using a difference-in-CATEs test: we simulated random assignment 10,000 times, calculated the F-statistic comparing the two nested models (Model 2 and 3) across our schedule of potential

outcomes, assuming a constant treatment effect of 3.584. When we did this, only 1.82 percent of the F-statistics generated under the null model exceeded the observed F-statistic of 5.26, implying that the interaction term significantly added explanatory value. In other words, the difference between the treatment effects on elites and non-elites is statistically significant.

We do not find strong evidence of a difference when we compare monitors to non-monitors. The treatment-monitor interaction term is negative although insignificant, and the effect of treatment for non-monitors is slightly larger, although lessens in its significance. Again, we use simulation to test for the difference-in-CATEs, but we find that the interaction term included in Model 5 does not add significant explanatory value, as 59 percent of our simulated F-statistics exceeded the observed F-statistic of .289.

In sum, our results suggest that rejection may have a positive treatment effect among poor or less educated Americans but a negative treatment effect among wealthier or college-educated Americans. We emphasize the descriptive nature of these results and propose that background characteristics related to class may be strongly related to individuals' priors about the status of India and influence how the signal is received. We leave these questions of heterogeneity and the aggregation of status for future work.

A.4 Results from Alternative Survey 1: Hypothetical Treatment on US Sample

We fielded a second version of the experiment simultaneously with the main experiment in which we provided our respondents with texts about a natural disaster in a hypothetical country instead of India. The objective of this experiment was to learn how our results generalized outside the case of India. Here we present the analysis we proposed conducting in our pre-analysis plan.

Respondents learned only whether “Country X” was low- or high-income, a democracy or an autocracy, and had a strong or weak military, and each of these characteristics was randomized. The treatment texts we used are:

On the next page, you will be asked to read about a hypothetical scenario. You will read about a situation that many countries have faced and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach that leaders have taken, and ask you for your views. Please read the scenario and imagine how you would feel if these events were happening today.

An 8.2 magnitude earthquake struck and caused hundreds of thousands of casualties and displaced millions of people in Country X. This was one of the worst natural disasters this country has ever experienced. The country is a **[low-/high-]income** country with **[a democratic government that is elected by the people / an autocratic government that is not elected by the people]**. The country has a **[strong/weak]military**. To aid relief efforts, the international community offered to provide millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance, **[but the government of Country X declined the offer, stating that it did not need outside help. / and the government of Country X accepted the offer, stating that it needed outside help.]** The government declared a state of emergency and promised immediate relief to affected victims.

Individuals assigned to the hypothetical experiment performed just as well on our comprehension questions as did individuals assigned to the India experiment: 98 percent were able to identify the type of natural disaster that struck Country X, and 94 percent of individuals correctly identified whether Country X accepted or declined assistance. As indicated in Table 5, our balance tests also succeeded for this sample.

The results presented in Table 6 reveal some similarity but also some notable differences from our India results. As in the India experiment, the rejection treatment significantly improved individuals’ confidence in the country’s ability to address the disaster. In both experiments, individuals stated that they would not support the government after learning it had rejected aid, although this effect is over twice as large in the hypothetical scenario as it is in the India scenario. The main finding of the India experiment, loses significance and some magnitude in the hypothetical experiment, although both experiments find no effect on ranking or on expectation that the country is a leader in international affairs. The largest difference between the experiments comes in individuals’ expectations of the US and the international community’s opinions of the rejecting country. Whereas rejection had no effect on individuals’ perceptions of how countries would view India, it had a strong and statistically significant negative effect for the hypothetical country that rejected

Table 5: Descriptive statistics and test of balance (Hypothetical treatment, US sample)

	Treatment		Control		Difference		N
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Difference	SE	N
Age	35.92	10.73	35.08	10.61	0.84	0.78	751
Male	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.50	-0.00	0.04	749
Edu (1-8)	4.30	1.35	4.13	1.34	0.17	0.10	751
Income (1-9)	3.91	2.52	3.88	2.47	0.03	0.18	751
Republican (1-5)	2.48	1.17	2.72	1.27	-0.24	0.09	735
Foreign born (0-1)	0.06	0.23	0.05	0.21	0.01	0.02	751
Follows news (1-4)	3.09	1.00	3.10	0.98	-0.00	0.07	751
Follows intl (0-1)	0.56	0.50	0.54	0.50	0.02	0.04	751

aid. Furthermore, rejecting aid caused individuals to believe that Country X should be *less* entitled to prestigious international positions such as UN leadership positions.

Table 6: Treatment effects of rejecting aid (Hypothetical treatment, US sample)


	Control		No covariates				With background covariates				With all covariates			
	Mean	SD	Coef	SE	p	N	Coef	SE	p	N	Coef	SE	p	N
Confidence	3.09	1.59	0.93	0.12	0.00	751	0.96	0.13	0.00	733	0.92	0.11	0.00	733
Support	5.75	1.27	-2.54	0.11	0.00	751	-2.50	0.12	0.00	733	-2.51	0.12	0.00	733
USopinion	2.08	0.50	-0.32	0.05	0.00	751	-0.32	0.05	0.00	733	-0.32	0.05	0.00	733
Intlopinion	2.11	0.55	-0.40	0.05	0.00	751	-0.40	0.05	0.00	733	-0.40	0.05	0.00	733
Status	47.26	26.94	1.38	2.02	0.49	751	2.10	2.13	0.32	733	1.37	1.72	0.42	733
Ranking	4.05	1.54	-0.03	0.12	0.77	751	-0.05	0.12	0.68	733	-0.01	0.10	0.95	733
Prestigrole	1.94	0.58	-0.21	0.05	0.00	751	-0.19	0.05	0.00	733	-0.20	0.05	0.00	733
Leader	3.62	1.38	-0.10	0.10	0.31	751	-0.14	0.11	0.18	733	-0.15	0.10	0.14	733

We believe that individuals given the hypothetical scenario—and especially those who were also told that the country was an autocracy—tended to imagine Country X as an enemy of the US and interpret rejection behavior with suspicion. We asked all respondents to identify the country they believed Country X was and to explain why they believed the government rejected aid. North Korea and Japan were the two most-cited countries. An individual who believed the rejecting country was North Korea would be highly likely to believe that the behavior was motivated out of neglect for the well-being of citizens and a fear of foreign involvement. Individuals citing Japan, although a US ally, may have been conditioned by Japan’s recent demonstration of ineptitude at containing a natural disaster.

Indeed, Figure 2 demonstrates that the reasons individuals offered for rejection behavior differed dramatically between the two scenarios. In the India scenario, individuals most frequently reported that the government had no need of external resources. The second most frequent explanation was that the government wanted to demonstrate to other countries that it could take care of its own (self-sufficiency). In contrast, in the hypothetical scenario, most individuals attributed the rejection to pride (often described as misplaced, nationalistic, or idiotic), whereas this explanation came in third in the India scenario. While the desire to appear self-sufficient also was the sec-

ond most-frequent explanation for Country X’s rejection, the third most popular explanation was the notion that the government would be indebted or beholden to other countries or to conditions attached to the debt. Finally, it is worth noting that “fear of outside interference or influence,” often associated with destabilizing the government, was a much more popular explanation in the hypothetical case than in the India case.

Figure 2: Reasons for rejecting aid



Note: A single respondent may offer more than one reason. *Noneed:* Respondent stated that the country did not require any other resources to address the disaster. *Selfsuff:* The country was concerned with how it would appear to other countries; rejecting made it look strong or self-sufficient, or showed that it could handle its own affairs. *Pride:* Often a one-word response, often negatively framed as misplaced or stupid. Although we recognize the relatedness of the concepts, we distinguish *pride* from *selfsuff* because *pride* often did not refer to how other countries would perceive the behavior; *pride* was often offered as an intrinsic motivation. *Debt:* Country was concerned with being beholden to another country, expected to reciprocate in another disaster, expected to repay the assistance, or expected to follow conditions or make concessions. *Outside:* Country was concerned with outside interference or influence, or could be overthrown. *FP diffs:* Country disagreed with the views or policy of the offering countries. *Culture:* Respondent alluded to a cultural reason a country refused to accept assistance. *Neglect:* Respondent referred to the country’s lack of care for its own citizens.

While we have focused in this project on the positive characteristics that rejecting aid can signal, the open-ended responses suggest that rejecting aid could, for some countries, signal negative characteristics, such as fear of outside interference or prideful leaders. Far from contradicting the argument of this paper, these results confirm our model’s prediction that the rejection signal succeeds only where it is plausible that the rejecting state is doing so because it is self-sufficient.

It is unlikely that any of our hypothetical scenario respondents who associated Country X with North Korea interpreted rejection as a positive signal. The strong representation of low-income and autocratic countries in our sample mitigates the overall average treatment effects.

We quantify this in Table 7, which reports the heterogeneous treatment effects of rejection on status based on the characteristics we assigned to the rejecting countries. Although none of our results are statistically significant, note that the direction of the coefficient on rejection is positive for high-income countries and negative for low-income countries, consistent with our model's hypothesis that low-income states are unable to use the rejection signal to persuade the international community that they are self-sufficient. In line with our explanation above, the positive rejection coefficient is larger for democracies than for autocracies, although again, the results are not statistically significant. While our experiment was not designed with the power to detect these heterogeneous treatment effects and this analysis was not pre-registered, we propose that future work address these important differences in how rejecting states are perceived by the international community.

Table 7: Heterogeneous treatment effects (Hypothetical treatment, US sample)

	Status						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rejection	1.379 (2.018)	1.257 (1.679)	2.535 (2.376)	1.278 (1.980)	0.584 (2.793)	1.376 (2.019)	2.317 (2.863)
LIC		-30.690*** (1.679)	-29.422*** (2.367)				
Rejection*LIC			-2.554 (3.359)				
Dem				10.822*** (1.980)	10.127*** (2.793)		
Rejection*Dem					1.397 (3.963)		
StrongMil						0.815 (2.019)	1.746 (2.847)
Rejection*StrongMil							-1.874 (4.040)
Constant	47.265*** (1.422)	62.691*** (1.453)	62.053*** (1.678)	41.940*** (1.702)	42.281*** (1.959)	46.857*** (1.745)	46.392*** (2.013)
Observations	751	751	751	751	751	751	751
R ²	0.001	0.309	0.310	0.039	0.039	0.001	0.001
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	0.307	0.307	0.036	0.035	-0.002	-0.003

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.5 Results from Alternative Survey 2: India Treatment on Indian Sample

To test whether India’s behavior could be explained by its desire to signal competence to the domestic population, we fielded our online survey using the Qualtrics market research sample in India on February 10-18, 2015 (N=397). The Qualtrics sample is nationally representative based on age, gender, and region. It is worth noting that our Indian sample is remarkably educated, with the average respondent reporting a college or graduate degree. The treatment text used was identical to the treatment fielded in the US, however there are differences in the outcome variables and background covariates we collected.

In India, the treatment group reports slightly higher assets than the control group (see Table 8). However, these differences are not substantively significant. This evidence is consistent with the assumption that randomization was successful.

Table 8: Descriptive statistics and test of balance among Indian sample

	Treatment		Control		Difference		N
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Difference	SE	N
Age	37.84	13.50	37.12	13.32	0.71	1.35	397
Male	0.48	0.50	0.52	0.50	-0.04	0.05	397
Edu (1-6)	5.55	0.80	5.51	0.93	0.04	0.09	393
Assets (1-11)	8.82	2.12	8.19	2.78	0.63	0.25	397
Income (1-5)	3.50	1.12	3.45	1.20	0.06	0.12	397
Belongs to caste (0-1)	0.18	0.39	0.15	0.36	0.03	0.04	385
Effectiveness (1-7)	4.29	1.52	4.23	1.45	0.06	0.15	397
Pride (1-7)	4.96	1.48	4.87	1.48	0.09	0.15	397

We collected pre-treatment views of India for Indian respondents. *Effectiveness*: “Relative to other governments, do you feel the government of India is more, less, or about as effective as other governments in terms of how well it addresses the needs of its people?” *Pride*: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: India should be proud of its role in international affairs.”

The main outcome we compare between our US and India samples is *confidence*. In both experiments, the question read: “How much confidence do you have in the Indian government’s ability to respond to the earthquake using its own resources?” This is an important variable to measure because in our theory, rejecting aid is a useful strategy only when it supports the perception that an actor is self-sufficient. If the audience lacks confidence in the actor’s self-sufficiency, then the signal should be unsuccessful.

While the rejection treatment improved confidence in the Indian government among Americans, it had no effect among Indians. The coefficient is small and statistically insignificant in every specification. Our explanation for this result is that Indian citizens do not suffer the same informational asymmetry that Americans do; with stronger and more informed priors about the competence of their government, Indian citizens do not value the rejection signal as strongly. In other words, domestic citizens are less easily fooled by a strategic aid rejection than are international observers with less information about the government’s competence. Because the rejection signal cannot persuade local citizens of self-sufficiency, it will not succeed in improving their reputation domestically.

We found null results for the other outcomes we asked of Indian respondents, although the other outcome measures we recorded differ from those we asked in the US and therefore are not truly comparable. The only result that approaches statistical significance is the treatment effect on Indians' ratings of India's international status. The question was worded "Please rate India's status as a global power." It is possible that Indians believe that rejection will improve their status, although our findings are inconclusive on this point.

However, we do not rule out the possibility that the lack of treatment effects in the India sample may be because of less comprehension of the survey. Immediately following treatment and before outcome questions, we asked individuals two comprehension questions. While questions differed slightly according to treatment condition, the first tested their comprehension of the natural disaster and the second tested their comprehension of aid rejection. Table 10 shows the results. Performance on the comprehension questions was nearly perfect among Americans.¹ Indians, however, hovered in the 50s and 60s. Insofar as comprehension is a measure of treatment "compliance," this suggests that random assignment may be a weak instrument for treatment compliance among our Indian sample, making it less likely that we would detect statistically significant results.

B Robustness Checks on Empirical Analysis

We perform additional robustness checks on our empirical results. We first run our analysis using a lagged measure of military expenditure. This addresses the possibility that the positive relationship between military expenditures and rejecting aid is mechanically induced, since governments may have to increase funding of the military in order to respond to a natural disaster. The findings, which appear in Table 11, remain unchanged.

We also address the sensitivity of our results to our sample selection. Our main sample comprises geophysical, meteorological, and hydrological disasters with a death toll over 300. We demonstrate the robustness of our results to alternative thresholds by using thresholds of 400, 500, and 600 deaths (Table 12).

We then conduct our analysis on a subset of the cases on our sample that are selected based on possibly more exogenous criteria: earthquakes with a Richter scale over 7 that occurred near a population center.² Earthquake magnitude and precise location are unrelated to politics or development. Ten cases from our original sample meet these criteria. Because the number of cases is too few to subject them to statistical tests, we present these data visually in Figure 3. We plot the ten cases according to our two main explanatory variables and illustrate the dependent variable in color. It is clear that among this sample, the only instances of rejection we observe are high either in ability to respond or in desire for status (measured by military expenditures); cases low in one

¹This is partly because we awarded a bonus to Americans who successfully answered the comprehension questions, but we were unable to do this for the Indian sample. In a pilot study on the American public without monetary incentives, about 90 percent of Americans identified the natural disaster and 70 percent of the treatment group correctly stated that India declined the offer of assistance. These results are still an improvement on the Indian sample's performance but are not as strong as the American sample who received monetary incentives.

²We obtained Richter scale data from NOAA's Significant Earthquake Database. See <https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1> We code the proximity of an earthquake to a population center using the USGS Shakemap Archive; we include an earthquake in which an area coded as including "strong" shaking included towns or cities with populations over 1000. See <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/list.php?y=2012>

Table 9: Treatment effects of rejecting aid (India treatment, India sample)

	Control		No covariates			With background covariates			With all covariates					
	Mean	SD	Coef	SE	p	N	Coef	SE	p	N	Coef	SE	p	N
Confidence (1-7)	4.50	1.31	0.11	0.13	0.39	397	0.04	0.14	0.74	313	0.08	0.11	0.50	397
Competence (1-7)	4.43	1.27	0.01	0.14	0.96	397	-0.00	0.12	0.98	313	-0.03	0.10	0.76	397
Econ Dev (1-7)	4.38	1.26	0.14	0.13	0.30	397	0.05	0.13	0.71	313	0.11	0.11	0.29	397
Influence (1-7)	4.40	1.34	-0.00	0.14	0.99	397	-0.09	0.13	0.50	313	-0.04	0.11	0.70	397
Status (1-7)	4.54	1.27	0.19	0.13	0.16	397	0.17	0.13	0.18	313	0.17	0.11	0.11	397
UNSC (1-7)	5.49	1.33	0.09	0.14	0.50	397	-0.08	0.14	0.55	313	-0.02	0.12	0.90	397
Intl Perc (1-7)	5.26	1.14	-0.00	0.12	1.00	397	0.04	0.13	0.75	313	-0.01	0.11	0.93	397

Background covariates: Age, gender, education, assets, income, state, party, caste, religion, effectiveness, pride
Imputations covariates: Education (mean), party (modal category), caste (mean), religion (modal category)

Table 10: Manipulation checks (India treatment, US and India samples)

	Control	Treatment
<i>US</i>		
Percent passing Q1	0.99	0.97
Percent passing Q2		0.95
N	373	385
<i>India</i>		
Percent passing Q1	0.56	0.69
Percent passing Q2		0.59
N	208	189

Q1: What kind of natural disaster struck India? Drought / Earthquake / Flood

Q2: India accepted an offer of humanitarian assistance from the international community. True / False

Table 11: Robustness of results to using lagged military expenditures

	Accepted aid				
	<i>logit</i>		<i>OLS</i>	<i>logit</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ability to respond	-0.676*** (0.251)	-1.503*** (0.380)	-0.118*** (0.036)		-1.629*** (0.476)
Log GDP				-2.512*** (0.688)	
Military expenditures (% of GDP, lagged)	-0.839** (0.426)	-1.074** (0.478)	-0.105* (0.061)	-1.107*** (0.403)	-2.231** (0.951)
UNSC					-0.021 (0.718)
Log other aid					3.401** (1.383)
Human rights					0.642** (0.272)
Year F.E.?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region F.E.?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	56	56		56	49
R ²	0.477	0.770		0.788	0.843

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Robustness to alternative threshold specifications

	Accepted aid		
	400 deaths	500 deaths	600 deaths
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ability to respond	-1.683*** (0.451)	-1.985*** (0.758)	-1.835*** (0.619)
Military expenditures	-0.961*** (0.344)	-1.465*** (0.336)	-1.210*** (0.365)
Year F.E.?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region F.E.?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	52	48	41
R ²	0.802	0.835	0.820
χ^2 (df = 12)	47.834***	47.249***	39.100***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

or the other all accept aid.

C Coding of Case Studies


In the main text, we describe the coding rules we applied to the 66 case studies that comprise our original data set. For the interested reader, here we present our case study descriptions with our justifications for each decision.

We investigated these case studies by searching news articles in Proquest, LexisNexis, and Google News. Our keywords included the country's name, the type of disaster (e.g. floods), and we limited our results to the year following the event. We cross-referenced our case descriptions with reports from UNOCHA on each disaster.

We sought to code the following:

- reject: How did the country respond to the natural disaster? 4. The country rejected all offers of aid or declared that it would not accept any international assistance 3. Either the country rejected aid initially but later accepted, or the country made a concerted effort to play down the significance of aid that was accepted 2. The country accepted international assistance but did not make an appeal for international assistance 1. The country appealed for international assistance
- success: Coded only for instances of reject=3 or 4. Was the government still able to respond to the disaster without international assistance? 0. No. 1. Yes.

Figure 3: Earthquake-only sample



Note: Sample includes all earthquakes (a) with Richter magnitude above 7.0 and (b) that produced strong shaking in a populated area.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a case of a low-lying country vulnerable to floods and storms. It lacks the resources to address these disasters but has over time improved its ability to respond to disasters. Nonetheless it accepts assistance from foreign actors to finance these activities especially in response to local discontent with the capacity of the government to address food prices and sanitation concerns quickly.

2004 Flood

The floods in late July and early August 2004 were the worst Bangladesh had experienced in six years and covered 60 percent of the land mass of the country and affected 30 million people and caused 7 billion USD in damage. The floods affected those living in low-lying slums disproportionately and caused massive sanitation risks. The floods were especially damaging because it took several months for the water to drain. Dhaka experienced yet another resurgence of the flood in September, when they called on their navy to remove floodwater from streets.³

The government initially was slow to call on international community for aid. It stated that its own relief efforts were enough, but several large NGOs said it should reconsider and pointed out that conditions would worsen over time.⁴ Two days later, Bangladesh was not shy about portraying the direness of its situation and appealing for food aid. Assam Health Minister Bhumidhar Burman

³http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3654480.stm

⁴http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3928463.stm

said. “There is an acute scarcity of baby food and over 500,000 babies affected during the floods are starving.” On July 29, the disaster management minister, Chowdhury Kamal Ibne Yusuf, said the country has enough food and medical supplies for now but will need international help to rebuild roads, bridges and schools.⁵ Four days later, he added that food aid was needed because crops and jobs had been lost in the floods. He also added starvation was unlikely, suggesting that the appeal for aid was in part useful for allaying individuals’ concerns that they would not be provided for. Although aid agencies reported that the government had sufficient emergency food, their assistance was still needed to transport the food aid to flood-affected regions.

If anything, the difficulty was not enough foreign aid. The UN appealed to the international community for more aid, stating that it received less than 20 percent of the funds it asked for for the WFP. This enabled it to perform basic relief but not to equip populations with resilience to a future flood. Chowdhury Kamal Ibne Yusuf said that there was sufficient financial support to fulfill the government’s promise to feed five million families.⁶

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3530532.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3928463.stm

We code **reject=3** and **success=0** because the country tried to delay accepting international assistance, but soon found that its resources were woefully inadequate.

2007 Flood

The 2007 flood in August, although disastrous, was on a smaller scale than the 2004 flood. In response to the 2004 flood, the government had prepared for some of the dangers of the flood by installing a system of tube wells to allow uncontaminated drinking water and acquiring oral rehydration salts. The international community saw these efforts as having successfully reduced the number of diarrheal cases, one of the primary threats after a flood.⁷ The government immediately mobilized 700,000 mobile health teams and its armed forces in response to the flood and set up 1,200 shelters.

The government operated in cooperation with UN agencies on the ground and the WHO. The government signed a \$75 million agreement with the IDA to finance the re-building of schools and advertised additional donor funding.⁸ The government also requested food aid in response to local discontent. The government tried to address rising food prices with open market measures, but riots broke out in mid-August against the government, resulting in curfews in six cities.⁹ The government requested food aid from major donors.¹⁰

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bangladesh_40538.html

We code this case as **reject=1** because the government requested relief and coordinated with multilateral organizations.

⁵http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3937489.stm

⁶http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3633424.stm

⁷<http://www.irinnews.org/report/73894/bangladesh-effective-systems-keep-diarrhoea-in-check>

⁸<http://www.irinnews.org/report/74909/bangladesh-floods-and-erosion-destroy-schools>

⁹<http://www.irinnews.org/report/73982/bangladesh-flood-victims-face-rising-food-prices>

¹⁰<http://in.reuters.com/article/2007/08/20/idINIndia-29059420070820>

2007 Cyclone

Cyclone Sidr was the most powerful storm to hit Bangladesh in a decade. Bangladesh had prepared for a disaster of this nature by investing in a network of cyclone shelters after a cyclone killed half a million Bangladeshis in the 1970s. Officials claimed that the shelters dramatically reduced the resulting casualties.¹¹ The government also evacuated over 3 million people before the storm hit and delivered rice, tents, and blankets immediately after it passed.¹²

The WFP assisted the government by providing food, purification tablets, and medicine. Bangladesh openly asked for international aid and even opened its visa gates to foreigners, including journalists.¹³ Bangladesh received over \$140 million in assistance from foreign donors. It denied suggestions that it was not up to the task of disbursing aid effectively, although journalists reported that some of the more rural locations did not receive aid in a timely manner.¹⁴

We code this case as **reject=1** because the government openly asked for international aid.

Colombia

2010 Flood

Floods in Colombia in November and December 2010 were estimated to cause damage of \$5 billion.¹⁵ On November 19 President Santos declared a state of emergency, stated that the government's capacities were overwhelmed, and asked for international aid.¹⁶ Santos asked for \$2.6 billion in international aid. The government had been extremely unprepared for the floods, had a difficult time getting international attention because they unrolled more slowly, and its bad building codes and development strategies had caused damage to be higher.¹⁷ The government tried to blame the severity of the disaster, arguing that it needed aid because it was the "worst natural disaster in the history of Colombia."¹⁸

At the time of the flooding, President Correa of Ecuador was visiting Colombia in the first diplomatic visit since 2008 when Colombian forces bombed a Colombian guerrilla camp in Ecuador. The two presidents used the opportunity to demonstrate Correa's solidarity with Colombia by showing him handing out food relief to victims.¹⁹

We code this case as **reject=1** because the government asked for international assistance openly.

¹¹http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7099497.stm

¹²<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1685330,00.html>

¹³<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/world/asia/21bangladesh.html>

¹⁴http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7100957.stm

¹⁵<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12006568>

¹⁶<http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/11/19/colombia.rain.calamity/>

¹⁷<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/colombia/101201/rainy-season-floods>

¹⁸<http://www.unhcr.org/4d1ca1786.html>

¹⁹<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12006568>

Ethiopia

2006 Floods

Floods in 2006 killed between 250-900 people and displaced many thousands in late July and August. The floods were caused by heavy downpour during the rainy season, which caused the rivers to swell, and consequently EMDAT codes these as two separate floods in different areas from one extremely wet season. We combine them and add their casualties and number affected in our data set. Many of those killed were in Dire Dawa, which was especially hard hit by floodwaters. One of the main dangers to individuals was from crocodiles. Victims surrounded by floodwaters requested evacuation by motor boat or helicopter.²⁰

But many individuals refused to be evacuated out of areas of flash flooding because they did not want to abandon their livestock, the main source of assets for families.²¹ Agriculture accounts for 40 percent of GDP in Ethiopia.

Heavy rains had caused numerous deaths during the previous year.

International aid agencies and governments both responded to the crisis but were said to be overstretched.²² The government established a flood recovery program that provided government housing to displaced families satisfying vulnerability criteria, but the government was chronically short of funds, as pledged aid was not disbursed.²³ There were few high-profile offers of international assistance in this case, perhaps because the floods occurred gradually. According to UNOCHA FTS, there was an international appeal that was only partially funded.²⁴

We code this case as **reject=1** because the government appealed for international aid, and international aid was not forthcoming.

Guatemala

2005 Cyclone

Guatemala was the country worst hit by Hurricane Stan in October 2005, experiencing landslides and flash floods. Several villages were completely submerged in mud.²⁵ President Oscar Berger declared a state of emergency shortly after the death toll had reached 500.²⁶ Nonetheless, he was criticized for responding too slowly, as federal aid was not disbursed in a timely fashion to the areas of Parnabaj where the death tolls were the highest.²⁷ The government was also criticized for calling off the search for survivors too early and declaring them dead.²⁸

²⁰<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4791813.stm>

²¹<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060831-ethiopia-floods.html?source=rss>

²²<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4797415.stm>

²³<http://www.irinnews.org/report/73980/ethiopia-flood-survivors-struggle-one-year-on>

²⁴<https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&emergID=151166>

²⁵<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4326084.stm>

²⁶<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4322442.stm>

²⁷http://www.democracynow.org/2005/10/11/devastated_by_mudslides_guatemalan_villagers_refuse

²⁸<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4333676.stm>

Residents of Parnabaj actually refused aid from the Guatemalan military. The area is mostly of indigenous descent and had been victimized in a 1990 massacre and had haunting memories of a 36-year conflict that ended in 1996.²⁹ Distrust of the government trumped individuals' desperate need for relief.

The medium-term impact of the hurricane was devastating. The Ministry of Agriculture stated that over 30 percent of crops were destroyed in an agricultural economy dependent on coffee, cocoa, beans, sugar, and rice.³⁰ Even before the hurricane arrived, child malnutrition in Guatemala was 50-80%. Guatemala became concerned that it would face a severe hunger crisis if more international aid was not forthcoming, and feared that donors did not grasp the severity of the situation.³¹ Both government and international donors provided relief.³²

We code this case as **reject=1** because the government essentially begged for international assistance. (We do not count the case of refusing aid from the Guatemalan military as a case of outright rejection, only a case of country-specific rejection.)

North Korea

2007 Flood

North Korea is the most closed country on Earth, yet after being hit with torrential rain and extreme floods for a week in 2007, it petitioned the international community for assistance. In 2006, the regime had similarly requested aid from the international community for flood relief, but it did so only after waiting a month. This suggests that the regime cared about its international reputation and waited to see how challenging handling the flood would be at home. (The international community withheld the aid after Pyongyang's nuclear test in October 2006.) But in 2007, it requested aid immediately and openly showed photographs of the damage.³³ The government stated that the floods had killed over 600 people and left 100,000 people homeless. The Ministry of Agriculture also announced that it had destroyed 11% of the rice crop.³⁴ South Korea pledged nearly \$50 million in aid, and the Red Cross launched a global appeal for \$5.5 million.³⁵ In this case, a country that had previously experienced dire food shortages was completely unprepared to handle floods and was forced to call on the international community despite a long history of insularity.

We code this as a case of **reject=1** because the government went to significant lengths to illustrate how unprepared it was for its natural disaster. This is a particularly surprising case because of North Korea's history of insularity; North Korea is a country most would expect to reject needed aid. It is possible that this is an exception then that proves the rule: North Korea used the flood as an opportunity to signal to the international community that it cared enough about its citizens to accept aid.

²⁹http://www.democracynow.org/2005/10/11/devastated_by_mudslides_guatemalan_villagers_refuse

³⁰<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/08/AR2005100801464.html>

³¹<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4426240.stm>

³²<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5407730.stm>

³³<http://www.irinnews.org/report/73980/ethiopia-flood-survivors-struggle-one-year-on>

³⁴<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6947230.stm>

³⁵<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6963889.stm>

Madagascar

2004 Cyclone

Cyclone Gafilo hit the island of Madagascar twice in March 2004. The government immediately appealed to the international community for assistance.³⁶ Torrential rains and flooding killed 25 people. The extreme weather caused massive food security issues, as the floods damaged rice paddies in Lake Aloatra, considered to be Madagascar's "rice basket."³⁷ Madagascar sought the support of the WFP and FAO to assist in establishing a rice reserve. By September, the Minister of Industry was looking to import cheap rice, stating that the government could not buy the rice itself but was appealing to rice-growing countries to sell their surplus to local importers at low prices. "The first objective is for our people to have enough to eat," Oliver Andrianarison said, adding: "We are risking social and political chaos in this country if this issue is not addressed."³⁸ Madagascar was unprepared to recover from the cyclone with food security and openly accepted international aid to prevent unrest.

We code this as **reject=1**.

Morocco

2004 Earthquake

A February earthquake killed over 500 people near the city of Al Hoceima in Morocco. The Moroccan army and paramilitary forces dispatched helicopters to help survivors and search for victims. France and other European countries offered to send in emergency teams.³⁹ After the earthquake, the leading relief operation was by the Moroccan Red Crescent Society.⁴⁰ International aid was abundant,⁴¹ with many countries having established tents for displaced residents shortly after the quake.⁴² European countries assisted with the rescue effort and also provided food and blankets.

International news reported widespread discontent with the government's own response. Just two days after the crisis, survivors demonstrated in a series of violent protests, insisting that they knew aid had been disbursed by their government but that they had not received it. The BBC reported that a man called Hassan shouted "The local councillors have stolen the aid, they must have done a deal amongst themselves." One man was reported to have stated, "Look around you and see the aid coming in – from France, from Spain, America, so many countries. But where is

³⁶<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3497494.stm>

³⁷<http://www.afrol.com/articles/15967>

³⁸<http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/madagascar-looking-to-import-cheap-rice-1.221217#.VV4HrOfwPOp>

³⁹<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3515803.stm>

⁴⁰<https://www.ifrc.org/ar/noticias/noticias/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco/all-means-used-to-distribute-morocco-earthquake-aid/>

⁴¹http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_3240_en.htm <http://www.ofid.org/NewsEvents/ArticleId/849/-OPEC-Fund-extends-emergency-aid-to-earthquake-victims-in-Morocco>
https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10_E14665_asof___1505211433.pdf

⁴²<http://reliefweb.int/report/morocco/moroccan-protests-grow-even-international-earthquake>

our government? What is Morocco doing to help itself?”⁴³ The king of Morocco Muhammad V immediately went to the region to show his support for the recovery process.⁴⁴

We code this case as **reject=2** because the king did not appeal for international aid but accepted the many offers he received.

Nigeria

2012 Flood

The heavy rains in Nigeria in July-October 2012 were the worst Nigeria had experienced in five decades and caused the River Niger to swell, killing only hundreds but displacing two million.

President Goodluck Jonathan called the floods a national disaster but stated that they would not cause a food crisis. His other rhetoric also suggested that he was concerned with the public image of the government’s response, visiting the site of the floods and commending domestic and international responders.⁴⁵ He stated, “Government is doing everything possible to cushion the effects on you ... it will soon be over.”⁴⁶

There is reason to criticize the government’s response. The floods were aggravated by poor drainage in Nigeria’s cities.⁴⁷ State officials, especially with the National Emergency Management Administration, prioritized settling displacing people and improving the drainage situation.⁴⁸ Jonathan allocated \$111 million in aid for flood relief and rehabilitation, but was criticized by IDPs for not having done more to prepare for floods through dredging and sand-filling flood-prone areas.⁴⁹ Moreover, the military was entirely absent from relief, preoccupied elsewhere with Boko Haram. A year after the floods, citizens reported that government did not help them to rebuild and resettle but rather left as soon as waters receded.⁵⁰ However, a representative of UNICEF excused the government’s response, arguing that the government had a preparedness plan in place for half a million people, but that the scale of the flooding (2 million) could not have been predicted by anyone.⁵¹

That said, although several agencies, including MSF and the International Red Cross, provided aid, observers commented that the Nigerian floods did not seem to attract the attention of foreign donors. Even more puzzling, the government of Nigeria did not seem to be asking for the funds it needed.⁵² While Nigeria did not reject any offers of international assistance, it did not appear to adopt a strategy of exposing the direness of the situation in an attempt to attract foreign donors. Instead, it sought to assure individuals that the government would protect them from the effects of the flood, and failed to do so adequately.

We code **reject=2** because the government accepted offers but did not seek them out.

⁴³<http://reliefweb.int/report/morocco/moroccan-protests-grow-even-international-earthquake>

⁴⁴<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3490790.stm>

⁴⁵<http://www.channelstv.com/2012/10/11/flood-jonathan-begins-on-the-spot-assessment-of-r>

⁴⁶<http://www.aljazeera.com/weather/2012/10/201210129319935818.html>

⁴⁷<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20221451>

⁴⁸<http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/05/world/africa/nigeria-floods/>

⁴⁹<http://www.irinnews.org/report/96504/nigeria-worst-flooding-in-decades>

⁵⁰<http://www.irinnews.org/report/98644/floods-test-nigeria-s-preparedness>

⁵¹<http://www.irinnews.org/report/96739/nigeria-floodwaters-recede-but-millions-remain-dis>

⁵²<http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2012/10/26/is-the-west-uninterested-in-nigerias-floods/>

Uganda

2010 Landslide

Landslides caused by heavy rain in March 2010 killed 80-300 individuals in Bududa District, north of Kampala. The nearby mountain Mt. Elgon had developed a crack that was known to present vulnerability to local populations. The government announced its plans to open a road to reach the affected communities and appealed to the international community for funds to purchase a heavy-duty helicopter.⁵³ UN agencies responded immediately to prevent a cholera outbreak and to provide food and shelter to displaced in Bududa.⁵⁴ UN agencies responded in conjunction with the government according to a preparedness plan developed in 2009.⁵⁵ President Musaveni visited the affected areas by helicopter just two days after the landslide.⁵⁶ He criticized local residents for settling on a floodplain, blaming the disaster in part on local farmers who had stripped the land of vegetation which would have protected it from heavy rainfall.⁵⁷ Uganda's government asked individuals in low-lying and flood-prone areas especially near the crack in Mt. Elgon to evacuate pre-emptively, anticipating further landslides.⁵⁸

Uganda's disaster management law is relatively undeveloped – most appeals for short-term relief in this situation were made by the Ugandan Red Cross.⁵⁹ One report stated that the government appealed for international aid to assist the relocation effort, but this appeal does not appear to have been very high-profile, as there were few news stories of international donor offers.⁶⁰ It relocated 3,000 to safer areas after the 2010 landslide, but several returned to their ancestral homelands. Aid agencies criticized government for not putting more resources on the relocation effort.⁶¹

We code this as a case of **reject=2** because the government accepted aid but did not appeal for aid. If anything, it faced punishment for not soliciting more aid.

Sri Lanka

2004 Tsunami

Description of event

The December 26, 2004 earthquake and following tsunamis killed 31,000 people, left 4,000 missing and destroyed 100,000 homes.

Aid: Accepted

Sri Lanka accepted aid following the disaster. Sri Lanka even received \$25 million in aid from India, which was also hit hard by the disaster (Hall 2004).⁶²

⁵³<http://allafrica.com/stories/201003090016.html>

⁵⁴<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34013#.VV4c9-fwPOo>

⁵⁵http://www.unicef.org/emergencies/uganda_53042.html

⁵⁶<http://www.irinnews.org/report/88299/uganda-access-problems-limit-landslide-aid-respons>

⁵⁷<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8548808.stm>

⁵⁸<http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/03/environment-uganda-landslides-experts-warn-worst-is-yet->

⁵⁹<http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41164/UGANDA-report.pdf>

⁶⁰<http://www.globalissues.org/news/2010/03/09/4797>

⁶¹<http://www.irinnews.org/report/95748/uganda-learning-lessons-from-lethal-landslides>

⁶²Although note that Sri Lanka initially rejected a 150 person rescue mission from Israel due to the military person-

Government preparation: Not prepared

Sri Lanka did not have sufficient resources to respond on its own. There was no coordinated plan for responding to such a large disaster, there was no tsunami warning system, and no disaster plans could be located. All roads in affected areas were totally inaccessible following the tsunami, and rescue efforts were confused and slow to mobilize (Yamada et al. 2006).

Capable of being prepared? No

Its GDP in 2002 was only \$3,540 and the healthcare system was not prepared, leading to fears of disease outbreaks.

Further, the country had been engrossed in a civil war that had lasted for decades, so that the violence and chaotic governing atmosphere compounded the situation. Indeed, “The preexisting civil conflict coupled with the scale of the disaster proved to be too much for the government of Sri Lanka to handle. There simply was not enough capacity on the part of the government to deal with such a massive disaster” (Ching 2011, 6). In fact, some areas that were not open to foreign assistance before the disaster were then opened to foreign aid (Farley 2008). Note also that it was difficult to administer the aid because the civil turmoil made reaching an agreement over aid distribution difficult (Islam Web 2005). Reports also questioned whether the rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, welcomed aid or interfered in foreign aid disbursement (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005).

We code this case as **reject=1** because Sri Lanka took costly steps to open its country to outsiders in order to accept foreign aid.

Indonesia

2004 Tsunami

A series of tsunamis followed the earthquake of magnitude 9.1 struck Aceh, Indonesia on December 26 2004. The disaster killed 130,000 people and displaced 500,000 (Fan 2013). Governance broke down completely in Aceh. Two days after the tsunami hit, Indonesian President Yudhyono requested international aid and opened Aceh to international disaster relief. Both local and international organizations and volunteers poured assistance into Indonesia, pledging \$4.8 billion for Indonesia by the end of the year (Fan 2013).

Indonesia had no choice but to accept aid, as reconstruction efforts would take at least \$6 billion and would reach \$8 billion if Aceh’s facilities were to be upgraded, a bill which Indonesia could not afford alone (Fan 2013). Agencies estimated that even with all of the international help, reconstruction could take two years. Aceh was the fourth most poor province in Indonesia and had been engulfed in conflict for 30 years. It had not been open to international aid organizations due to the conflict and tension with the government, and thus was extremely ill-equipped to deal with the disaster. Aceh was so conflict-ridden that the aid was necessary to respond effectively, and was used to bring an end to the fighting (Fan 2013).

We code this case as **reject=1**.

nel on the crew, but later accepted a delegation of 60 soldiers from Israel instead (Hall 2004).

2005 Earthquake

A magnitude 8.7 earthquake struck on March 30 near Sumatra but did not cause a tsunami, as many feared after the previous year's experience. Many fled to higher ground immediately after the earthquake in preparation for a tsunami.⁶³ The earthquake was not nearly as destructive as in 2004, but it particularly affected the island of Nias, where 600 people died from flattened buildings and 20,000 people went without water.⁶⁴ Oxfam and the UN were shortly in Nias providing relief.⁶⁵ Singaporean military helicopters landed in Nias and distributed food and water, as well as medical supplies, generators, and troops. The main difficulty in responding to the disaster was the lack of infrastructure and machinery on Nias and the failure of power at the hospital. A spokesman for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoroyono, Andi Malarangeng, stated, Indonesia "welcomes and is open to all kinds of assistance, including help from foreign troops to assist in the disaster zone." Australia and Japan planned military relief operations and provided blankets, generators, sleeping tents, and medical supplies. The UN assisted in coordinating the relief effort.⁶⁶

Just a week prior to the earthquake, seismologists from the University of Ulster had warned that the December 2004 earthquake had produced stress in the Sunda trench and increased the likelihood of further quakes.⁶⁷ The Indonesian government's openness to aid after this earthquake may have been the result of international consensus surrounding the unusually destructive nature of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, the attention on Indonesia, and the quickness with which the March '05 quake followed, before Indonesia had even really had a chance to recover.

We code this case as **reject=1** because the president openly appealed for international assistance.

2006 Earthquake

A 6.2 magnitude earthquake struck Java on May 27. No tsunami resulted from the quake. It hit a densely populated area close to the city of Yogyakarta and killed over 5,000. President Susilo Bambang Yadhoyono called on rescuers to work around the clock, visited the area, and ordered the military to help evacuate victims. He even relocated his offices to be closer to the rescue effort.⁶⁸ The Indonesian Red Cross also deployed rapid response teams. Indonesia received offers of aid from Malaysia, Australia, Japan, Russia, and the EU.⁶⁹ The UN also sent aid. The US and China each pledged \$2 million.⁷⁰ According to UNOCHA FTS, the country appealed for international assistance.⁷¹

We code this case as **reject=1**.

⁶³http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/03/0328_050328_sumatraquake.html

⁶⁴<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/28/international/asia/28cnd-quake.html>

⁶⁵<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4389243.stm>

⁶⁶http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/31/content_429762.htm

⁶⁷http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/03/0316_050316_sumatra.html

⁶⁸http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-05/28/content_601866.htm

⁶⁹<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5022558.stm>

⁷⁰http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-05/28/content_601866.htm

⁷¹<https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&emergID=15130>

2006 Tsunami

On July 17 a 7.7 earthquake offshore of Java caused a tsunami that produced waves from 10 to 20 feet high. This was not nearly so destructive as the 2004 tsunami. Houses on the coast were swept away but the waves did not go far inland, and most fled before they struck. An early warning was issued just minutes before the waves struck.⁷² Indonesia's tsunami warning system, set into motion after the 2004 disaster, was not scheduled to be ready until later, so the government did not face too much blame for its preparation.⁷³ The tsunami in 2006 did re-energize the push for a tsunami warning system, which the president pledged to install by mid-2008.⁷⁴ The tsunami killed 800 and displaced over 35000. The country's military and disaster response unit both responded in conjunction with aid agencies. This being the fourth earthquake in less than two years, these actors were well prepared to work in cooperation with one another and extend existing efforts.⁷⁵

It is not clear that the government appealed to international donors or publicized the extent of the damage, so we code this case as **reject=2**.

2009 Earthquake

A 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck Sumatra on September 30. The earthquake heavily affected the city of Padang, whose mayor had earlier in the year asked for funds for potential earthquake relief and management but was turned down by national authorities.⁷⁶ On the other hand, observers noted that many cities in Indonesia were at similar risk and the national government is too cash-strapped to fund all of them. President Yudhoyono told reporters that the country could coordinate the relief efforts and welcomed help from abroad. Indonesia received offers from Australia, South Korea, and Japan.⁷⁷

Because the president stated that the country would welcome help from abroad, we code this case as **reject=1**.

2010 Tsunami and 2010 Volcano

(In EMDAT, these two cases are coded separately. We combine them and sum the number killed and the number affected.)

On October 25, a 7.7 magnitude earthquake triggered a tsunami in western Sumatra. While an early warning system, set up after the 2004 tsunami, should have been in place, it did not appear to work – buoys that measure ocean waves seem to have been out of action when the quake hit.⁷⁸ President Yudhoyono returned early from a meeting in Vietnam to oversee relief. The government

⁷²<http://www.nature.com/news/2006/060717/full/news060717-2.html>

⁷³<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/07/060718-java-tsunami.html>

⁷⁴<http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/07/20/death-toll-from-indonesian-tsunami-hits-547-323.html>

⁷⁵<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/world/asia/19cnd-indo.html>

⁷⁶<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1927157,00.html>

⁷⁷<http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/01/us-quake-indonesia-idUSTRE58T39720091001>

⁷⁸<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1324471/Indonesias-tsunami-warning-failed-broke.html>

mobilized the Indonesian military to supply aid, as rough weather made it difficult for many aid to reach the island.⁷⁹

On October 26, Indonesia's Mount Merapi erupted. It erupted again with much greater force on November 3 and again on November 12. Local officials established refugee camps after the first eruption but told reporters that the aid would desist unless the national government declared a national disaster.⁸⁰ Authorities had anticipated the eruption for days and took preparatory measures, but efforts were complicated by the fact that a small tsunami struck just a few weeks earlier in a different part of the country.⁸¹ Between the second and third eruptions President Yudhoyono called the volcano a crisis situation and visited Yogyakarta to oversee relief. He also promised the 200,000 residents who were displaced compensation for livelihoods and animals, as many residents tried to return between eruptions to tend to their livestock.⁸² Aid workers said that the government was unprepared to handle an eruption of this degree.⁸³ It was able to provide only 7 shelters, which housed 12,000 refugees.⁸⁴ Many of the relief shelters that were established were by multinational corporations with strong CSR programs.⁸⁵

The US and the European Commission each pledged \$2 million in humanitarian assistance in response to both the tsunami and the eruption of the Mt. Merapi volcano.⁸⁶ Initially, Indonesia refused offers of foreign aid. On October 27, Indonesia's foreign minister said that he did not yet see a need for foreign aid or rescue assistance. Observers conjectured that this was because Indonesia feared it had lost ownership of the 2004 reconstruction process by accepting foreign aid and that this undermined its legitimacy.⁸⁷ Later reports indicated that Indonesia had accepted about \$1 million from Australia.⁸⁸ It also received offers of assistance for the joint catastrophes from the EU, Australia, and Malaysia, but it is unclear whether those offers were ever accepted.⁸⁹ The government says that it welcomed international assistance, however it did not appear to solicit international relief explicitly or publicize offers of aid.⁹⁰ This is a case in which Indonesia first tried a strategy of aid rejection but quickly realized that it could not pursue this strategy because of its lack of preparedness for the disasters it faced. It accepted foreign assistance but never begged for them.

Because the government first tried to reject foreign aid, we code this case as **reject=3** and **success=0**, since the government so clearly required foreign assistance to respond to a crisis of this

⁷⁹<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11632982>

⁸⁰<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-11683612>

⁸¹<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/27/world/asia/27indo.html>

⁸²<http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/12/indonesia.volcano/>

⁸³<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/indonesia/8105250/>

[Indonesias-aid-effort-for-Mount-Merapi-volcano-survivors-criticised.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/indonesia/8105250/Indonesias-aid-effort-for-Mount-Merapi-volcano-survivors-criticised.html)

⁸⁴<http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/indonesias-economy-at-mercy-of-disasters-20101031-1770.html>

⁸⁵<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/indonesia/101104/indonesia-volcano-philip-morris>

⁸⁶<http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/29/indonesia.quake/>

⁸⁷<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/10/>

[indonesias-latest-tsunami-why-is-the-country-resisting-foreign-aid/65279/](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/10/indonesias-latest-tsunami-why-is-the-country-resisting-foreign-aid/65279/)

⁸⁸<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/struggle-to-deliver-tsunami-aid/story-e6frg6so-1225945339235>

⁸⁹<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/10/29/aid-pours-indonesia%E2%80%99s-twin-disasters.html>

⁹⁰<http://www.voxy.co.nz/national/world-vision-indonesia-escalates-response-merapi-eruption-5/71307>

severity.

Philippines

The Philippines experiences typhoons about 20 times per year.⁹¹ While some storms stand out more than others, it is important to remember that disasters are a matter of routine for this country. It is also facing an armed insurgency. Even though it has received considerable assistance, it has not been enough, so it tends to accept all the help it can get.⁹²

2004 Cyclone

Typhoon Winnie hit the Philippines as a tropical depression on November 30. It killed over 1500. Typhoon Winnie was made more destructive by the short arrival of a second cyclone, Typhoon Nanmadol, on December 2. Particularly hard hit was the town of Real in Quezon province, where 150 died in a landslide. President Gloria Arroyo visited Real a few days after the storm to deliver aid. She argued that the landslide was caused by illegal logging and immediately ordered a crackdown on illegal logging.⁹³ The Philippines received offers of humanitarian assistance from Australia⁹⁴ and the EC⁹⁵. The Philippines also asked the US and Japan for food and medical supplies, with the chairman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council stating that resources were stretched thin.⁹⁶

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2006 Landslide

On February 17 a landslide following heavy rains killed over 1000 living in the village of Guinsaogon.⁹⁷ Villagers had evacuated the area when heavy rains posed threats of severe flooding but returned when the rains ended.⁹⁸ This was the deadliest single-event landslide since 1998. Two US warships carrying \$100,000 in disaster equipment were dispatched to the area, and US marines helped dig to search for survivors.⁹⁹ Australia and China also pledged \$700,000 and \$1 million respectively.¹⁰⁰ The aid was accepted, as President Arroyo stated that all government resources

⁹¹<http://www.scotsman.com/news/world/at-least-300-die-in-floods-as-typhoon-winnie-hits-ph>

⁹²<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303277704579344133809431684>

⁹³<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2004/dec/02/naturaldisasters.climatechange1>http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/international/asia/02filip.html?pagewanted=print&position=&_r=0

⁹⁴<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2004-12-03/australian-funds-to-aid-philippines-storm-relief/>596770

⁹⁵http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2004/dec_philippines_02000.pdf

⁹⁶<http://m.gulfnews.com/news/world/philippines/manila-seeks-aid-after-deadly-storm-1.340379>

⁹⁷<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4722702.stm>

⁹⁸<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/international/asia/17cnd-mud.html>

⁹⁹<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4726218.stm>

¹⁰⁰<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4730154.stm>

were being continuously exhausted.¹⁰¹

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2006 Cyclone

Typhoon Durian hit the Mount Mayon area, south of Manila, on December 1, killing nearly 1400. The storm sent mud and rocks tumbling down the volcano and destroying villages below.¹⁰² The typhoon also caused widespread electricity outages and food and water shortages. President Arroyo declared the situation a national calamity and mobilized government resources to search for and aid survivors.¹⁰³ Arroyo released \$20 million for reconstruction work. Shortly after the disaster, the Philippine National Red Cross stated that they needed more food, aid, supplies and body bags. The Philippine Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that they accepted aid from Canada donated \$876,000 and Japan \$173,000.¹⁰⁴

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2008 Cyclone

Typhoon Fengshen struck the Philippines on June 21 and left on June 23. Many of the fatalities resulted from a sunken ferry carrying 700 passengers. The storm hit the area of Western Visayas the worst.¹⁰⁵ President Arroyo ordered cleanup and rescue operations, but did not cancel her 8-day trip to the US which had been scheduled to begin in the few days after the storm.¹⁰⁶ When President Arroyo met with President Bush, he ordered the US Navy to move the USS Ronald Reagan to the Philippines to help provide relief.¹⁰⁷ President Arroyo stated publicly that she intended a governmental investigation into why the ferry was allowed to sail in the storm.¹⁰⁸ The Philippine government sent its air force to the affected area to deliver relief. The Presidential Assistant for Western Visayas Paul Baniyas and Iloilo City Mayor Jerry Trenas appealed to international relief agencies for assistance.¹⁰⁹

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2009 Cyclone

The Philippines was hit by two tropical storms back to back in late September and early October: first Ondoy (Ketsana) and then Pepeng (Parma). Ketsana struck northern Manila and even affected the presidential palace. Shortly after the storm, the government of the Philippines appealed for

¹⁰¹<http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/grim-search-goes-on-for-survivors-of-mudslide/2006/02/19/1140283950580.html>

¹⁰²<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6197478.stm>

¹⁰³<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/world/asia/03cnd-philippines.html>

¹⁰⁴<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/typhoon-death-toll-rises-in-philippines/>

¹⁰⁵<http://www.irinnews.org/report/78886/philippines-typhoon-fengshen-death-toll-rises-to-2>

¹⁰⁶http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/world/asia/22Philippines.html?_r=0

¹⁰⁷<http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/24/us-philippines-weather-bush-idUSN244771122008>

¹⁰⁸<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/25/philippines.ferry/index.html?iref=topnews>

¹⁰⁹<http://www.thenewstoday.info/2008/06/23/typhoon.frank.ravages.western.visayas.html>

foreign aid.¹¹⁰ President Orroyo addressed complaints that aid was not coming quickly enough by calling the storm a “once-in-a-lifetime typhoon emergency.” Unlike other parts of the Philippines, Manila had not experienced widespread flooding before and was not prepared to handle the disaster. The government was forthcoming about its lack of preparation: “The system is overwhelmed, local government units are overwhelmed,” said Anthony Golez, a spokesman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council. “Our assets and people are spread too thinly.” The government’s weather bureau faced criticism that it had not warned people adequately.¹¹¹ The government opened parts of the presidential palace for aid distribution.¹¹²

One responsive donor was the World Food Programme, which sent food relief. The US also promised immediately 50,000 USD in immediate assistance.¹¹³ Several nations and the UN also pledged assistance.¹¹⁴

This is a case in which the government, despite its history of cyclones, was unprepared for the disaster because it affected the capital city, which usually was not affected by storms. This also meant that there was a spotlight on government efforts. The government solicited international assistance because it was obviously unprepared and had faced criticism already for its lack of preparation; rejecting assistance would only fuel criticism.

Typhoon Parma followed shortly, hitting a more northern area of the Philippines on October 4.¹¹⁵ While the storm hit more rural areas, it compounded the earlier disaster and only added to the Philippines’ willingness to accept relief.

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2011 Cyclone

Typhoon Washi arrived in the Philippines on December 15 and left on December 18. It affected the area of Mindanao most heavily, causing villages on small islands to be washed away.¹¹⁶ Although the Philippines is frequented by typhoons, this southern area usually went unaffected and was unprepared for the storm. The government came under some criticism for this. President Benigno Aquino declared a national calamity, promised government assistance, and acknowledged mistakes—especially in allowing low-income housing to be built in flood-risk areas, and the role of logging.¹¹⁷ Government agencies were vocal about the extent of the damage they suffered and overt about the list of countries that had offered assistance.¹¹⁸

Rebel organizations within the Philippines were reported to have raised their own aid for the relief efforts. They also vowed punishment for those responsible, both corporations and government officials culpable for illegal logging.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁰<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8279801.stm>

¹¹¹<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/world/asia/29philip.html>

¹¹²<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/09/30/vietnam.typhoon.ketsana.toll/>

¹¹³<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/world/asia/29philip.html>

¹¹⁴<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/09/30/vietnam.typhoon.ketsana.toll/>

¹¹⁵<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8285721.stm>

¹¹⁶<http://news.nationalpost.com/news/typhoon-in-the-philippines-kills-at-least-250-hundred>

¹¹⁷<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16260205>

¹¹⁸<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/us-philippines-typhoon-idUSTRE7BL0PR20111222>

¹¹⁹<http://www.timeslive.co.za/world/2011/12/26/philippine-typhoon-toll-1249-rebels-urge-pu>

Both China and the US offered aid to the Philippines.¹²⁰ Aid agencies also appealed for funds to help the Philippines.¹²¹

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2012 Cyclone

Typhoon Bopha hit Mindanao, the same area affected by Washi in 2011, on December 4. President Aquino took credit for evacuations that prevented the death toll from being higher.¹²² The government evacuated 50,000 people and moved millions of dollars of relief supplies into position.¹²³

The UN Humanitarian Chief reported that the Philippines had appealed for international assistance.¹²⁴ Many countries, including the US, offered humanitarian assistance.¹²⁵

We code this case as **reject=1**.

Haiti

2004 Flood

Heavy Caribbean rains in late May affected Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In Haiti, the rains came just months after Aristide left office, so US troops were already in country to assist with flood relief. This meant it would be virtually impossible for the interim government to deny assistance in such a situation. This fact was attested to by government officials. "The government is doing the best it can," said Henri Bazin, Haiti's finance minister since March, "It is obvious that we do not have sufficient means to face this crisis."¹²⁶ US and Canadian troops each provided food relief and medical supplies to both Haiti and the DR, and the Red Cross launched an international appeal.¹²⁷

Interim Haitian PM Gerard Latortue blamed the extent of the damage on deforestation.¹²⁸ This was an accusation in part because of his recent arrival to office and the regime change.

Because Haiti admitted its inability to address the disaster, we code this case as **reject=1**.

2004 Cyclone

In late September, Cyclone Jeanne took an exaggerated toll on Haiti due to years of deforestation, which resulted in a lack of topsoil to absorb rain, and resulted in landslides.¹²⁹ Haiti's interim

¹²⁰<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18/us-philippines-weather-idUSTRE7BG09G20111218>

¹²¹<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16336706>

¹²²<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20590437>

¹²³<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/04/world/asia/philippines-typhoon/>

¹²⁴<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/typhoon-bopha-threatens-philippines-again/2/>

¹²⁵<http://globalnation.inquirer.net/58883/us-sends-aid-to-ph-after-deadly-typhoon>

¹²⁶<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/30/world/haiti-struggles-to-cope-with-new-disaster.html>

¹²⁷http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/05/28/caribbean.storm/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD

¹²⁸http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/05/28/caribbean.storm/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD

¹²⁹<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/haiti-floods-due-to-deforestation/>

government also lacked the power to adequately prepare or respond to the floods, and so UN Peacekeepers were deployed to handle flood relief.¹³⁰ Kofi Annan made an international appeal for relief.¹³¹ Haiti's interim PM Gerard Latortue also made an international appeal for help, calling Haiti a "vast sea."¹³² "In the face of this tragedy, which is of the magnitude of a humanitarian disaster, I appeal urgently for the solidarity of the international community," stated President Boniface Alexandre at the UN.¹³³

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2008 Cyclone

In early September, Hurricane Hanna arrived just on the heels of two other hurricanes that battered Haiti. Food and medical supplies from the UN arrived quickly. The US also made arrangements to deploy the USS Kearsage from Colombia to Haiti and planned to send additional aid.¹³⁴

The hurricane also arrived just as politicians in Haiti had voted out their prime minister after food riots broke out. The new PM Michele Pierre-Louis flew over the affected area but faced criticism for not landing in it. Local operations officials and advisors noted that the hurricane affected the same area that was leveled by Jeanne in 2004, and it did not make sense that the population resettled in low-lying areas. One commented, "These storms have pointed out the weakness of the Haitian state. Why are we surprised every time a storm hits when we know another one will come?"¹³⁵ After already facing political pressure over food, the government could hardly turn down assistance.

Pierre-Louis explicitly requested international assistance.¹³⁶

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2010 Earthquake

On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, followed by around 50 aftershocks, affecting about three million people and killing at least 100,000 (USGS 2014). Haiti was highly unprepared for the earthquake, especially one of such magnitude, despite having a history of severe and destructive earthquakes. The country had an extremely low GDP (\$6.635 billion in 2010), widespread poverty (80% of people below the poverty line in 2003), and poor infrastructure. Indeed, it ranks 149/182 on the Human Development Index (Anand and Sen 2014) and is the poorest state in the Western Hemisphere. Further, other governments had determined that Haiti was unprepared for such a disaster (Smarttraveller 2010), and the Food and Agriculture Organization deemed it "economically vulnerable" (Renois 2010). The country lacked any building codes and used poor construction materials, such that nothing was constructed for earthquake resistance, and the country experienced water and fuel shortages even prior to the earthquake (Inside Disaster 2014). The

¹³⁰<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3685534.stm>

¹³¹<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3681812.stm>

¹³²<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3674990.stm>

¹³³<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3677894.stm>

¹³⁴<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/05/haiti.aid/index.html?iref=24hours>

¹³⁵<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/world/americas/11haiti.html>

¹³⁶<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7607976.stm>

country's infrastructure that was necessary to deal with the damage was destroyed, including hospitals, transportation infrastructure, and communication equipment. The education system stopped functioning, government buildings collapsed, and around 250,000 homes were destroyed (Loney 2010).

As a result, there was no opportunity for Haiti to reject aid as a credible signal of preparedness and self-sufficiency- its needs were too great. Instead, Haiti called for humanitarian aid, and many states responded with funds and personnel, with millions of dollars of aid collected (Loney 2010).

We code this case as **reject=1**.

Dominican Republic

2004 Flood

Heavy Caribbean rains in late May affected Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In Haiti, the rains came just months after Aristide left office, so US troops were already in country to assist with flood relief. This meant it would be virtually impossible for the interim government to deny assistance in such a situation. The DR benefited from its proximity to US and later UN occupied Haiti. US and Canadian troops each provided food relief and medical supplies to both Haiti and the DR, and the Red Cross launched an international appeal.¹³⁷

DR President Hipolito Mejia flew with US Ambassador Hatter to visit the affected towns and declared a national day of mourning.¹³⁸ He also appealed for international aid.¹³⁹ The US pledged \$50,000 in assistance.¹⁴⁰

We code this case as **reject=1**.

Peru

2007 Earthquake

An earthquake of magnitude 7.9 hit Peru on August 15, 2007, killing around 600 people, injuring around 1,000 and leading to extensive damage of infrastructure (Elhawary and Castillo 2008). The Peruvian government immediately declared a state of national emergency and accepted international aid. The aid was well-coordinated and rapid, leading to an effective disaster response. While Peru had a national disaster prevention and response system, the government had been decentralized, leaving much of the response to the local level, which lacked capacity. This led to a chaotic initial response until the international aid began to arrive. The disaster was clearly “beyond the capacity of the regional defense committees, and...investment in capacity-building and response planning had been inadequate” (Elhawary and Castillo 2008, 10). The local defense committees, which were responsible for the initial response “were poorly equipped in terms of financial and

¹³⁷http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/05/28/caribbean.storm/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD

¹³⁸http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/05/28/caribbean.storm/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD

¹³⁹http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-05/28/content_334644.htm

¹⁴⁰<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3756621.stm>

human resources and they lacked the necessary training and preparedness.” (Elhawary and Castillo 2008, 10). The regional authorities did not feel any obligation to prepare for a disaster and there was no oversight or incentives. As a result, there was confusion, no evacuation, lack of coordination, and lack of reliable information. The government was widely criticized for its ineffective response.

Interestingly, although Peru accepted aid, the same concerns over perception and signaling were evident. For instance, the United Nations advocated adopting a cluster approach to the response, whereby groups of humanitarian organizations would be in charge of each element of the response. However, the government was afraid that such an approach would “have implied that the government lacked the capacity to mount an adequate response and was unable to meet its responsibilities....The government was keen to use the earthquake response as an opportunity to demonstrate its capacity” (Elhawary and Castillo 2008, 12). Because of the ineffective local response, the central government created a parallel response mechanism; however, this made the local authorities look “incompetent and ill-prepared” (Elhawary and Castillo 2008, 20). As a result, at the local level, many firms in the private sector offered to assist with the response, but their support was refused “in an attempt to show that the local government had everything under control” (Elhawary and Castillo 2008, 14).

We code this case as **reject=1**.

Pakistan

2005 Flood

On February 11, after a week of unusually heavy rain and snow, a dam in southwest Pakistan (Balochistan province) burst and completely washed away five villages. Persistent heavy rains and snowfall also caused avalanches and made it difficult to reach affected areas with aid.

The Pakistani armed forces immediately deployed to the affected area and dropped relief where helicopters could not land.¹⁴¹ Local government, NGOs, and the UN mobilized to provide assistance in the form of food and relief, while the military continued evacuation efforts. According to a report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Currently, the Government of AJK, NGOs and the Pakistan Red Crescent Society have adequate supplies to meet the immediate known needs of the affected population. Access is still a problem in the region and local authorities hope to field further assessment missions.” The government did not request international assistance although it worked tightly with the UN, which agreed that the government had sufficient resources to handle the disaster.¹⁴² The assistance it is recorded as accepting, according to UNOCHA FTS, comes primarily from private donors; it did accept small sums from the US and the UK.¹⁴³

Because Pakistan accepted some relief but insisted that it had adequate supplies, we code this case as **reject=3**. The government’s response appeared timely and sufficient, so we code **success=1**.

¹⁴¹http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4256107.stm

¹⁴²<http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-rains-and-snowfall-ocha-situation-report->

¹⁴³https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R24_E14909___1507190300.pdf

2005 Earthquake

After the 2005 Kashmir earthquake of magnitude 7.6, which was followed by severe aftershocks, over 73,000 people were killed, tens of thousands injured, and around three million displaced (BBC News 2005). Reports estimated that it would take a decade to rebuild. Deaths continued to climb due to untreated injuries and cold weather. Infrastructure was completely destroyed in Kashmir (BBC News 2005).

Pakistan was not prepared, nor could it have been. Many buildings in Pakistan are poorly constructed. Because the quake swamped available capacity and resources, Pakistan requested international assistance immediately and \$5.4 billion arrived from a variety of countries, including India, which was also hit by the disaster (BBC News 2005).¹⁴⁴ The New York Times contrasted Pakistan's approach with that of India, which rejected aid, stating, "Pakistan's approach has been exactly the opposite...Pakistan has appealed for worldwide help and allowed foreigners to travel to its side of Kashmir" (Sengupta 2005).

We code this case as **reject=1**.

2010 Flood

Pakistan also suffered from severe flooding in 2010, which killed 1,500 people and was estimated to cost billions in long-term reconstruction efforts (CBS News 2010). The flooding totally "overwhelmed the government" (CBS News 2010). When the flooding hit, the government was already dealing with a poor economy and waging a war against Taliban militants, such that it had few resources left for clean-up.

Some of the Taliban urged the government to reject aid as part of their political posturing, but the government did not do so (CBS News 2010). The added political pressure to reject put more spotlight on the government's decision to accept aid, so we code **reject=1**.

2011 Flood

The 2011 flood resulted from months of heavy rain between late August and early November. The flood especially affected southern Sindh province, which was affected by the floods of 2010.

The central government of Pakistan in Islamabad requested international assistance. Provincial Minister Muzaffar Shajra acknowledged the gravity of the situation: "The situation is extremely bad. We cannot carry out relief operations because of continuous rains." The UN, the US, Japan, and China each pledged food, tents, and monetary assistance. The floods came at a particularly shaky time for the government of Pakistan, which was battling both Islamist militants and economic turmoil.¹⁴⁵ Some blamed the government for its failure to repair levees from the preceding year's destruction.¹⁴⁶ Stated National Disaster Management Authority Chairman Dr. Zafar Iqbal Qadir, "The Government of Pakistan has responded swiftly to the recent disaster with all resources available at our disposal. The situation is still unfolding and with the forecast of new rains and likely

¹⁴⁴Note that the government refused India's offer of helicopters to help with the disaster recovery initially, but accepted other forms of aid from India. It also later accepted the helicopters too (Sengupta 2005).

¹⁴⁵http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/13/pakistan-floods-2011_n_960509.html

¹⁴⁶<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-14894041>

depletion of local resources. The Government has requested the international humanitarian community to come forward and share our burden for life saving areas that are shelter, food security, health and water, sanitation and hygiene, along with identifying any pressing needs in protection, nutrition and early recovery. The help is to be provided now before this disaster consumes more human lives in the country.”¹⁴⁷

Even though the government requested and accepted international assistance, it did face criticism for not being self-sufficient enough to address its own disaster. Allegations of nepotism also undermined the legitimacy of the government’s response.¹⁴⁸

Moreover, it also faced criticism for delaying its acceptance of international assistance. Oxfam, Save the Children, and Care International published a report stating that the government waited until September 7 to accept assistance, even though waters were rising early in August.¹⁴⁹

Because the government waited to accept international assistance, we code this case as **reject=3**. The signal did not appear to be strong enough to temper domestic criticism of the lack of the government’s self-sufficiency. The government’s response ended up being unsuccessful, so we code **success=0**.

2012 Flood

Heavy monsoon rains in September 2012 affected the same area that had been hit by floods in the previous two years: Sindh and Balochistan. Despite the severity of the floods, many agreed that the 2012 flood was not on the same scale as the 2010 and 2011 floods.¹⁵⁰

On September 28, it was reported that the government intended to recover from the floods using its own resources. “The government’s point of view is that the situation will be handled from own resources,” said spokesman for the National Disaster Management Authority Ahmad Kamal.”¹⁵¹ Nonetheless, Pakistan received an offer of assistance from the EU.¹⁵²

The government’s primary responder was the army, which had to pull out of Taliban-occupied regions in order to provide relief to flood victims. Despite this serious cost to providing relief, and the fact that many did not see relief forthcoming, the army insisted that it was the responsibility of the government to provide relief.¹⁵³

Tension resulted about a month after the flood over who provided what assistance. A US Congressional Report stated that the US DOS and USAID provided more relief to flood victims than did the government of Pakistan; while the NDMA of Pakistan complained that US figures were grossly exaggerated, and that many of the funds were never disbursed.¹⁵⁴

Domestically, criticism surfaced over the inadequate amount of money the central government pledged to address flood relief. The NDMA insisted to news sources that it did not accept any

¹⁴⁷<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/09/11/national/un-launches-humanitarian-assistance>

¹⁴⁸<http://tribune.com.pk/story/251230/2011-floods-sindh-submerged-in-flood-of-miseries/>

¹⁴⁹<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9084203/>

EMBARGOED-GMT-0001-Pakistan-floods-Oxfam-and-Save-The-Children-report-accuse-Pakistan-of-
html

¹⁵⁰<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19722037>

¹⁵¹<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19763569>

¹⁵²<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19763569>

¹⁵³<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19722037>

¹⁵⁴<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2012/1022/US-outspends-Islamabad-on-flood-relief-in-Paki>

offers from international donors, for the first time.¹⁵⁵

An International Crisis Group report also noted that the government's restrictions on the operations of international and NGOs was bad judgment, in light of the efforts by radical jihadi organizations to use charitable relief as a front for extending their regional influence.¹⁵⁶

Even if the government did accept some assistance, it made extreme efforts to undermine the necessity of the assistance it did receive, and at times outright denied accepting assistance. Domestic and international criticism over this decision did surface: no one was fooled into thinking that the government's response was adequate. Consequently, we code **reject=3** and **success=0**.

China

China is a disaster prone country and has experienced several major disasters recently. The Chinese Foreign Ministry either rejected or did not seek aid after each disaster, stating that it had the situation under control. Consistent with the populist activity of the Communist party, leaders capitalized on the high visibility of natural disasters to showcase relief efforts by the regime.

2006 Cyclone (Bilis)

Warm Pacific currents produced a particularly stormy summer for China in 2006. Typhoon Bilis arrived in July, only a month after another strong storm. Initially, the Chinese government reported low death tolls from the disaster; subsequent investigation uncovered that local officials had concealed the extent of the damage. The Chinese government insisted on its intention to understand who was concealing the extent of the damage.¹⁵⁷

The Red Cross of China appealed for aid on July 21.¹⁵⁸ According to a UNOCHA Situation Report, "The Government has not request any international assistances to date, however, the Government welcomes assistance from the international community."¹⁵⁹ Because of this, we code **reject=2**.

2006 Cyclone (Saomai)

Typhoon Saomai arrived in August, one month after Typhoon Bilis. The government announced that it would provide \$21 million in disaster aid to those affected by the 2006 storms.¹⁶⁰

Affected families criticized the government for under-reporting the death toll and for not providing assistance to affected families.¹⁶¹ Locals asserted that the government was only competent

¹⁵⁵<http://tribune.com.pk/story/474326/floods-2012-three-months-on-victims-await-govt-aid/>

¹⁵⁶<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/237-pakistan-no-end-to-humanitarian-crisis.aspx>

¹⁵⁷<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/world/asia/23china.html?n=Top%2FNews%2FWorld%2FCountries%20and%20Territories%2FChina>

¹⁵⁸<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/aug/11/china.naturaldisasters>

¹⁵⁹<http://reliefweb.int/report/china/china-floods-ocha-situation-report-no-3-4>

¹⁶⁰<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/typhoon-kills-more-than-100-in-china/>

¹⁶¹<http://reliefweb.int/report/china/typhoon-toll-hits-295-china-anger-simmers-over-aid-ef>

at preventing anyone from speaking with journalists.¹⁶² Investigative reporting months after the storms of 2006 continued to uncover instances of Chinese media uncovering instances of government coverup and forcing the government to revise its calculation of the damage upward.¹⁶³

According to a UNOCHA Situation Report, the government did not request any international assistance specifically for Saomai, but welcomed assistance from the international community.¹⁶⁴ Because of this, we code **reject=2**.

2007 Flood

In June 2007, China experienced severe flooding, killing 650 people throughout the flood season. Despite the severity of the floods, international journalists credit the government with lower tolls than would have been expected, as the result of the government's preparations (early warning and evacuation systems).¹⁶⁵ The flood did not receive very much international attention: it is unclear that an offer of international assistance ever arrived. One source asserts that China rejected international assistance after the floods (Farley 2008). Because of this, we code **reject=4** and **success=1**.

2008 Earthquake

On May 12, 2008, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit the Sichuan province of China, killing over 74,000, injuring 247,000 and displacing 5 million, after which many aftershocks hit, four above magnitude 5.0 (The Economist 2008).

China accepted some money and supplies after the earthquake in 2008 but did not accept relief workers (Tong 2008). President Xi Jinping said in 2008, "the relief work is happening efficiently and orderly" (The Economic Times 2013).

However, China was able to do so because it was capable of managing the disaster itself. Immediately following the 2008 earthquake, it deployed 100,000 troops to find survivors, the prime minister personally helped out for five days, and thousands of Chinese citizens volunteered to help with the clean up (The Economist 2008). The government also communicated effectively with the people rather than trying to cover up the extent of the disaster. Indeed, the 2008 clean-up was widely thought to be efficient and well executed. It managed to prevent disease outbreaks, relocated vulnerable populations, and displayed quick medical response (Tong 2008). China's skill in disaster management was also widely acknowledged after each natural disaster mentioned above, as China possesses the resources to clean up most disasters, though its prevention efforts still could be improved (Adams 2010).

China's rejection of international assistance was an important signal domestically, as the efficacy of the Chinese government's natural disaster response has historically been viewed as an important sign of the government's legitimacy. In the past, emperors poured resources into disaster management efforts, as they otherwise would risk the perception that they had lost the "mandate of heaven" (The Associated Press 2013). Indeed, state-run newspapers made sure to trumpet the

¹⁶²<http://www.asianews.it/news-en/No-government-aid-in-wake-of-Typhoon-Saomai-6962.html>

¹⁶³http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/13/world/asia/13iht-china.2794259.html?_r=0

¹⁶⁴<http://reliefweb.int/report/china/china-typhoons-ocha-situation-report-no-4>

¹⁶⁵<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1648724,00.html>

government's success in its relief efforts, stating that the response to the 2008 earthquake was "more mature" and that "in its ability to mobilize people and in other indicators, China's disaster relief comes ahead of the United States, Japan and other developed countries" (The Associated Press 2013). Thus, since China was able to respond to the disasters by primarily using its own resources, it made sure to do so.

We code **reject=4** and **success=1**.

2010 Earthquake

The magnitude 7.1 earthquake that struck on April 14 affected primarily ethnic Tibetans living in Yushu province in China, an overwhelmingly poor section of the country. For this reason, the quake presented a unique challenge to China: to deal with the aftermath of the quake, while also suppressing Tibetan activists.

The Chinese government allocated \$29 million to the relief effort.¹⁶⁶

Both President Hu Jintao and PM Wen Jiabao cut short international trips to visit the affected area and pledge aid to Tibetan survivors. The Chinese government did mount an impressive recovery operation, and made sure to feature its successes and the gratitude of Tibetans in prominent media. One Chinese author noted that both government and monks took the political opportunity to publicize their good works.¹⁶⁷ But tensions remained: on one occasion, Tibetan monks had been helping to clear rubble when Chinese soldiers arrived and forced them to leave the area. There were also several reports of Chinese officials and soldiers refusing relief to or underreporting casualties from monasteries or especially poor areas.¹⁶⁸

US Ambassador to China presented checks worth a total of \$100,000 to the Red Cross of China.¹⁶⁹ Otherwise, China did not ask for or receive offers of international assistance.

Because of the extremely small scale of the funds accepted, we code this as a case of **reject=4**. We note that the government coverup effort in this case, however, was less successful, and we code **success=0**.

2010 Flood

In June and July, persistent heavy rains caused widespread damage across China. By the end of August, the Chinese government estimated the losses from floods at \$30 billion.¹⁷⁰

The leadership of China made great efforts to be seen as responding to the needs of flood victims. Premier Wen Jiabo made multiple visits to the flooded areas.¹⁷¹ CCTV showed the premier traveling through the streets in galoshes.¹⁷² The Ministry of Civil Affairs provided relief as early as June.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁶<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/04/16/china.quake.premier/>

¹⁶⁷<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126101591>

¹⁶⁸<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/world/asia/18quake.html>

¹⁶⁹<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/04/16/china.quake.premier/>

¹⁷⁰<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/world/asia/12china.html>

¹⁷¹<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-22/china-evacuates-253-500-4-die-as-yalu>

¹⁷²<http://www.bbc.com/news/10406163>

¹⁷³<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/06/22/china.flood.deaths/>

The Chinese government did not receive or accept any offers of foreign aid. Mere weeks after the Yalu flooding, China even extended an offer of international assistance to Pakistan, dealing with its own floods.¹⁷⁴ In light of this gesture of self-sufficiency, we code **reject=4** and **success=1**.

2010 Landslide

By August 11, these heavy rains in Gansu province in northwest China had caused a mudslide. The mudslide raised the risk of contaminated water and spread of infectious disease. The Chinese government promised \$73 million in relief, promising to provide temporary shelter to victims and rebuild destroyed houses. The government came under some criticism for deforestation and settlement policies that could have mitigated damage from the disaster.¹⁷⁵ On August 22, the heavy rains caused the Yalu river to overflow in northwest China. A quarter million people were evacuated.

China did not appeal for international assistance. We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=1**, as criticisms of the government were not out of the ordinary.

2011 Flood

Heavy rains affected eastern China in June 2011. China raised its disaster alert to the highest level and mobilized troops to evacuate hundreds of thousands of people.¹⁷⁶ The floods triggered a mudslide, killing 170, and also caused a spike in prices of crops damaged by the rain.¹⁷⁷ These floods came just a month after the Chinese had admitted some major problems with the Three Gorges Dam that needed repairing, so the government was under pressure to demonstrate its capability.¹⁷⁸ Local authorities delivered aid but had difficulty accessing villages during continuing rains.¹⁷⁹ The Red Cross of China determined that international assistance was not required.¹⁸⁰

We code this case as **reject=4**. Even though there were difficulties in delivering aid, we code **success=1** because these difficulties did not arise because of lack of funds.

Thailand

2004 Tsunami

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake of 9.1 magnitude hit the Indian Ocean, lasting almost 10 minutes and resulting in a tsunami that affected people in 14 countries. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India,

¹⁷⁴<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/06/22/china.flood.deaths/>

¹⁷⁵<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0811/China-flooding-expected-to-worsen-with-heavy-rains>

¹⁷⁶<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13831068>

¹⁷⁷http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/19/china-floods-food-prices_n_879897.html

¹⁷⁸<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/20/china.floods/>

¹⁷⁹<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2005497/China-floods-More-5m-hit-eastern-China.html>

¹⁸⁰http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1302.pdf

and Thailand were the hardest hit countries. In Thailand in particular, the earthquake represented the most severe natural disaster in Thailand's history, killing 8,000 people, and generating \$2,198 million in damages and losses. Thailand's tourism industry, a key source of revenue, was hit particularly hard, greatly damaging the economy (Rosa 2012).

Yet Thailand had a good economy, with a GDP of \$161 billion and one of the fastest growing economies in East Asia. Only 10% of the population was below the poverty line (CIA 2004). Thus, the government was able to deal effectively with the disaster, as "there was a general consensus that the initial relief effort was quite satisfactory" (IFRC 2013, 167). Due to its relatively large resources, it was able to allocate \$1.7 billion to reconstruction efforts. It established the Tsunami Victim Relief Center, which coordinated its relief activities, and focused on immediately fixing logistical infrastructure and searching for victims. Though Thailand experienced complicated logistical issues following the disaster, it "coped relatively successfully with these challenges" (Bhanupong 2007, 6).

Because the government was competent and able to deal with the disaster, it could reject considerable foreign assistance. For instance, it turned away aid offers from many foreign donors, including debt relief from the EU, and focused on accepting technical assistance. Particularly during the "recovery and reconstruction phase," Thailand relied primarily on domestic sources, though it did not reject all aid, as technical assistance was particularly welcomed and the government allowed help with body identification and creating a tsunami warning system. In total, the government ended up accepting aid commitments totaling \$131 million and disbursements totaling \$68 million, or about 10% of its budget for the reconstruction (Bhanupong 2007).

Thailand's ability to reject much of its aid offers was seen as a good signal to both domestic and investor communities, as "the domestic community and corporate sector response was very positive, leading some analysts to argue that the decision to rely on domestic finances probably ensured a stronger overall response than would have otherwise been the case" (Bhanupong 2007). USA Today reported, "Immediately after the tragedy, Thaksin descended on devastated areas, walking among the victims, offering sympathy and government help and snapping orders to underlings like the billionaire CEO he used to be. He refused offers of international aid, saying Thailand could take care of itself. The performance won rave reviews in Thailand and beyond, and erased any doubt that he and his political party, called Thais Love Thais, would sweep to victory in Sunday's national elections" (Wiseman 2005). Before the disaster, Thaksin had been in danger of losing the election, leading the Asia Foundation's representative in Bangkok to say, "The tsunami saved his butt" (Wiseman 2005).

Further, many believe that Thailand rejected aid because it was "likely that the government wanted to send a message to the global investor community concerning its financial stability, fearing that acceptance of debt relief might hurt Thailand's credit rating and thus raise Thai borrowing costs and discourage capital inflows" (Bhanupong 2007).

Because Thailand rejected the lion's share of aid in a major disaster, we code this case as **reject=4**. The successful government response and electoral victory lead us to code **success=1**.

2011 Flood

Heavy monsoon rains starting in July 2011 caused flooding in central Thailand, and by October, the floods had started to reach Bangkok.¹⁸¹ Initially, peripheral districts were flooded, but officials became concerned that water level rise in the Chao Phraya river that cuts through the center of the city would cause the whole city to be flooded. The government evacuated individuals in the low-lying flooded areas, declared a five-day holiday to deal with flooding in Bangkok, and proposed digging channels to divert some of the water to the sea.¹⁸² The government also set up embankments to prevent the river from flooding parts of the city, but faced backlash and threats of violence from local civilians who protested that the embankments had caused their houses to be flooded.¹⁸³

The government faced criticism for its inability to prepare (deforestation, overcrowding of cities, and bad water management were cited)¹⁸⁴ It also faced criticism for confusion caused by contradictory messages from the local authorities and from the Prime Minister: by October 21, the PM finally took charge of relief.¹⁸⁵

Finally, the government faced criticism for being unwilling to call for international assistance. A US carrier docked in Thailand to provide assistance, but when the government of Thailand did not formally request assistance, it left. “Thailand needs international help, but the government has refused it,” says one Thai aid worker. “I don’t know why – whether it’s pride or politics.”¹⁸⁶ A possible explanation lies in Thailand’s interest in foreign investment. The severity of the floods hurt Thailand’s projected growth rate once the floods reached Bangkok, since so many international corporations operated in the capital city. The governor of the Bank of Thailand stated, “I am very much concerned that the flood problem will affect the confidence of foreign investors, who might move their production from Thailand to other countries.”¹⁸⁷ Moreover, this was an instance in which the international audience was very concerned with how the PM would respond, as she was only two months into her tenure, and because many perceived that the government was being really run by her brother, ousted in a coup.¹⁸⁸

It should be noted that Thailand did accept some small offers of international assistance as early as October (\$1.5 million from China and \$1 million from the US).¹⁸⁹ By late October, Thailand received assistance from Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore.¹⁹⁰ It was not until late-November that Thailand received an offer of \$10 million in assistance from the US.¹⁹¹ Thailand is a case of

¹⁸¹http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/08/thailand-floods-2011_n_1001468.html

¹⁸²<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15489415>

¹⁸³<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Flood-barriers-offlimits-30168387.html>

¹⁸⁴<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/world/asia/a-natural-disaster-in-thailand-guided-by-h.html>

¹⁸⁵<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/asia/bangkok-opens-floodgates-as-government-res.html>

¹⁸⁶<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b27a40ae-016e-11e1-b177-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3fsGWCCMq>

¹⁸⁷<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/asia/bangkok-opens-floodgates-as-government-res.html>

¹⁸⁸<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204479504576637970215290718>

¹⁸⁹<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/15/world/asia/thailand-flooding-aid/>

¹⁹⁰<http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2011/10/27/foreign-aid-starts-to-flow-into-thail>

¹⁹¹<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177239.htm>

a country that did not ask for international assistance until very late into the crisis, and when it did accept small amounts of international assistance early in the disaster, it played down the significance of these funds.

We code Thailand as a case of **reject=4** because the delay in the government's willingness to accept lasted so long. The strategy was clearly unsuccessful, though, so we code **success=0**.

Brazil

2011 Flood

Multiple floods and mudslides occurred in January of 2011 in the Rio de Janeiro state of Brazil, causing 903 deaths and was expected to cost \$1.2 billion to clean up (?). However, international aid was not needed. Brazil is a large country with considerable resources. The government immediately declared a state of emergency, freed up \$466 million for reconstruction, and sent supplies to the region. Municipal governments, the Navy, and state governments coordinated relief efforts as well. Many relief workers had prior experience in cleaning up after the 2010 floods in the region, as well as the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Analysts believe that President Dilma Rousseff "passed her first big test as a president of her skills in crisis management" as "the government has sent in adequate aid in terms of military rescue forces, health personnel and cash to families that lost all their belongings" (Berg-Nordlie 2011). Much of the deaths occurred in poor areas of the region due to the bad conditions of the favelas (Berg-Nordlie 2011).

We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=1**.

Chile

2010 Earthquake

On February 27, 2010, an earthquake of magnitude 8.8 hit Chile and lasted for about three minutes, leading to a tsunami that hit several cities in southern Chile. The disaster caused a blackout that affected 93% of the population, killed over 700 people, caused \$30 billion in damages, and destroyed the homes of 9% of the population (Thompson and Lacey 2010).

Chile is a country that could have been prepared for the earthquake, as it is one of the wealthiest and most developed states in Latin America, with a GDP of \$12,682 billion in 2010 (Group 2012). Indeed, Chile had invested in earthquake preparedness, had well functioning infrastructure, used proper building codes, and held many disaster-response drills. Yet Chile also had high inequality, and the earthquake disproportionately affected the poor, resulting in considerable damage in low-income areas in particular. The extent of the destruction resulted in the "growing perception...that the country was not as well prepared as it had thought" (Barrionuevo and Lacey 2010).

Because Chile initially wanted to showcase its preparedness to the international and domestic communities, it did not request aid initially, stating that it would only request international aid once it had assessed the extent of the damage. Many attribute this behavior to "the pride of Chile, that Chile is not Haiti. It is like Japan, or the US" (Liana 2010). Representatives of Chile stated that Chile did not need the aid since it was a "very strong government" with strong institutions, and was very prepared for disasters (Schimmelpfennig 2010).

However, following the earthquake, it became clear that Chile was not adequately able to deal with the disaster. Chile experienced looting, disorder, prison riots, and general chaos. The government sent the police in to restore order, imposed curfews, and later sent the military in, but this slow response was heavily criticized, with blame shifting between different branches of the government and military (Prada and Moffett 2010). Citizens remained without basic services, and complaints of slow response were widespread (Prada and Moffett 2010).

In response to the growing needs of its citizens, Chile decided to accept aid because it valued aid over support. This likely occurred for several reasons. First, Chile's president, Bachelet, was extremely popular prior to the disaster, with approval ratings above 80%, so that the government's support likely did not hinge on its response to the disaster (Prada and Moffett 2010). Further, the government may have cared less about its popularity in this case because the president had only 10 days left in office, leaving the rest of the clean-up to the president's successor (Barrionuevo and Lacey 2010).

Second, once the looting, riots, and destruction engulfed such a large swath of the country, it became politically important to respond to the disaster due to citizen backlash against the limited initial response (Liana 2010). Chile also likely cared about the welfare of its citizens, as it had very high human rights scores. For example, the widely used CIRI scores rated Chile a 7/8 in its physical integrity index, and 13/14 in its empowerment index in 2010 (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Third, Chile was already recognized as a country with a strong investment climate with a good reputation, such that its response to the disaster did not likely give investors much new information (Magud 2010). Indeed, investment and overall economic performance rebounded quickly following the earthquake (Magud 2010). While international pride was clearly a factor, since Chile tried initially not to rely on aid, and since it is a middle power that would likely aspire to obtain greater global influence. However, Chile's military expenditures have hovered between \$3-\$5 billion from 1988-2013 (Yearbook 2009), has no nuclear program, and it is not typically seen as vying for influence the same way that many other emerging economies are.

Because Chile tried to recover from the disaster without accepting aid, we code this as **reject=3**. Since looting, riots, and destruction broke out, though, we code this as **success=0**.

Taiwan

2009 Cyclone

On August 7, 2009 Typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan, lasting for three days. It killed and caused almost \$27 billion in damage. Ma went to a wedding and hosted a baseball game opening ceremony. Taiwan declined foreign aid twice, before Ma corrected the Foreign Minister and asserted that Taiwan never declined aid. While the media usually rallies the people around the government after natural disasters, the media blamed Ma for the inadequate handling of it.

We code this case as an outright rejection, **reject=4**, followed by a total failure in PR, so **success=0**.

Iran

2005 Earthquake

On February 22 a magnitude 6.4 earthquake struck near the city of Zarand in Iran. Although 612 died, the earthquake struck in a more sparsely populated area of Iran, and seismologists stated that this earthquake was very deep in the earth's crust, reducing the amount of a damage it caused. Iran did not appeal to the international community for assistance: officials stated that the situation was under control and that relief operations would be concluded shortly.¹⁹² Iranian relief officials said that the country had learned from the devastating Bam earthquake in 2003 and had improved their response capabilities.¹⁹³ UNOCHA concurred that the government's resources were sufficient to handle the disaster.¹⁹⁴ The US did make an offer of international assistance.¹⁹⁵

We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=1**.

2012 Earthquake

Two earthquakes hit Iran in rapid succession in August of 2012, the first of magnitude 6.4 and the second of magnitude 6.3. They killed more than 300 people and displaced over 16,000 (Shwayder 2012). Iran had the potential to be prepared for the earthquakes. GDP had climbed steadily since 2003, reaching a peak of \$514 billion by 2012 (Group 2012). But though it had the resources to prepare and was aware of the need for earthquake preparedness given that it had suffered many earthquakes in the past, it had made marginal improvements since its previous earthquake. The only major change in readiness was its efforts to promote public awareness, which included media initiatives and more drills in schools (Izadkhah and Amini Hosseini 2011). The reason that Iran was not prepared has been attributed to “wanton mismanagement and underfunding of the government's disaster relief programs and earthquake preparedness measures” (Nisman 2013).

In response, many international donors offered to provide large quantities of aid. This aid was needed badly as the relief organization coordinating the disaster relief—the Iranian Red Crescent—became unable to cope with the magnitude of the disaster (Torbaty 2012). A resident of an affected town stated, “Official rescues halted or seem to have stopped, as there is no hope of [anyone] alive to be unearthed, and the number of Red Crescent rescue teams is not big enough and few of them are trained enough” (Shwayder 2012).

However, rather than welcome international aid, Iran rejected aid from the U.S., Germany, Russia, Taiwan, and Turkey, claiming that they “[didn't] need foreign assistance” and could “handle the disaster itself.” The Assistant Policy Director at the National Iranian American Council attributed this response to Iran's desire to put politics ahead of citizen welfare. He stated “Iran needs to get its act together to communicate clearly and consistently that it is going to put well-being of its citizens first and accept international aid offers” (Shwayder 2012). News reports stated that “many Iranians saw the rejection of international assistance as a spiteful move on the government's part, seeking to further burden the people”

¹⁹²<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/22/iran.quake/>

¹⁹³http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4288709.stm

¹⁹⁴http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/23/content_418584.htm

¹⁹⁵http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4293611.stm

However, the government did not do so for several reasons. First, Iran likely sought to influence both international opinions by demonstrating that it was fully able to take care of its citizens without Western assistance. Iran is a strong regional power, and aspires to be stronger. To that end, it has conducted research and development toward developing a nuclear weapon since 1984, which many attribute to its global power aspirations (Ansari 2014). Iran has also been under U.S. sanctions since 1979, which were strengthened in 1995, and then came under international sanctions in 2006 for its continued uranium enrichment activities. Iran likely did not want to be perceived as being weak or reliant on the U.S. and other Western states. Indeed, Iran's head of the interior ministry's crisis management organization said it did not need the aid, saying that the West should instead, "Do us a favor and lift the sanctions" (Shwayder 2012). Further, Iran's military spending has increased each year from 2002-2006, rising from around \$8 billion to around \$16 billion (in current 2011 dollars), though its spending tapered off after 2006 likely as a result of the international sanctions. The government may have thus rejected aid in part to signal its competence and independence the international community.¹⁹⁶

Further, Iran did not seem to put a lot of weight on the welfare of the victims. Iran has an abysmal human rights record. CIRI gave it a score of 0/8 on its physical integrity index and 0/14 on its empowerment index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). While these scores are clearly the lowest possible, they are also particularly low relative to Iran's history, in which scores of 1, 2, or even 3 were common for physical integrity. This seeming lack of compassion was also evident after the earthquake, as President Ahmadinejad took a trip to Saudi Arabia less than two days after the disaster, causing many Iranians to criticize his lack of compassion (Daftari 2012). The government also called off its search-and-rescue efforts after a mere 48 hours, and state media outlets did not cover the disaster (Daftari 2012). Iran thus likely did not especially care about the suffering of its citizens in the wake of the disaster.

Iran thus valued support and pride above the welfare of its citizens in its response to the earthquake, rejecting aid from many sources. Insufficient earthquake response to the 1978 earthquake that killed 26,000 people contributed to overthrowing Iran's regime in the past, and the government was likely anxious to avoid a similar fate. As many have argued, "poor government response to earthquakes in Iran exposes the regime's corruption and incompetence" (World Public Opinion 2010). Iran later began to let in some aid, but only after intense domestic and international criticism.

We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=0**.

India

Consider India, one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world and an emerging global power. Until 2004, India always accepted international aid offers after natural disasters such as the 2004 Bihar floods, the 2002 Bengal cyclone, the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, the 1993 Latur earthquake, and the 1991 Uttarkashi earthquake (Kasturi 2013). However, after its 2004 tsunami, which killed more than 12,000 and displaced over 600,000 people, India announced that it would no longer accept disaster aid and instead provided aid to other states hit by the tsunami (Kasturi 2013). Indeed, it turned down assistance not only in 2004, but in each subsequent disaster in which

¹⁹⁶Investor opinions were likely not a large factor since investment was significantly curtailed due to the sanctions.

aid was offered. Examples are numerous. In each example, India claims that it no longer accepts aid because it no longer needs it. However, in many cases, India's level of preparedness to handle the scale of the disaster was far below what it should have been.

India greatly aspires to become a global power. It is a nuclear power, and had greatly increased its military spending in recent years. Specifically, India's military expenditures fluctuated between around \$17-19 billion from 1987-1994, increased at a fairly consistent rate from around \$20 billion in 1995 to \$29 billion in 2003, and then jumped dramatically to \$34 billion in 2004, \$36 billion in 2005, and continued to rise to \$49 billion in 2010 (Yearbook 2009). Its major power goals were also apparent in its attempt to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations security council, launching a joint effort with three other countries in 2004 (Welle 2004). Indian President Mukherjee stated that India was "eminently suited" for the position and had "affirmed its willingness and capacity to shoulder the responsibilities" due to factors such as GDP, population, size, political system, culture, and UN contributions (Indo-Asian News Service 2012). These factors, among others, contribute to the perception that India has "ambitions to assert itself as a world power" Sengupta (2005).

Indeed, many reports agree that India rejects aid for this reason. For instance, India's newspaper The Telegraph stated that India's aid refusals build "on a quiet but assertive diplomatic aid policy that has coincided with its growing economic clout. It's a policy that has seen India change from a country that happily accepted foreign aid to tide it over natural disasters just a decade ago to a nation that routinely rejects bilateral assistance to handle such crises" (Kasturi 2013). Further, "the policy is also about driving home a point to countries that have traditionally led the world's economic system" (Kasturi 2013). A retired Indian diplomat concurred, stating, "There's a certain sense of self-confidence that we can manage it and, let me say, a desire to signal that you are capable of managing things on your own" (Sengupta 2005). The president of the Henry L. Stimson Center stated, "Part of this has to do with national pride" (Sengupta 2005). Similarly, the director of a private research group in India stated that the rejection of foreign aid reflected India's aspiration to be one of "the big boys" in the international community" (Sengupta 2005) and it "says a great deal...about India's own ambitions to assert itself as a world power" (Sengupta 2005). Indeed, after the 2004 tsunami in which India first rejected aid and assisted other countries, Indian newspapers published articles with headlines such as, "Post-tsunami India's Image Rises Globally" (The Times of India 2005).¹⁹⁷

While most accounts agree that India's main purpose in rejecting aid was to signal to the international community, India also likely wanted to signal to its domestic population. 2004 saw the election of Prime Minister Singh, who wanted to shore up support. Thus, he began to reject aid after the 2004 tsunami in India because, "by receiving outside assistance, the logic went, India could look weak to its domestic population" (Werker 2010, 5). India thus put sending this signal ahead of the welfare of its citizens, as the director of a private Indian research group said, "The risk really is that in our refusal to accept aid I don't think we are keeping people to whom aid might go as central....We are playing politics with aid, using aid to make a statement" (Sengupta 2005). Indeed, according to CIRI's physical integrity index, India received a 0/8 for the vast majority of years since 1990, and its human empowerment score prior to 1998 hovered between 10-12, but after 1998 fluctuated between 7-9 out of a possible 14 (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). After India's refusal of aid after the 2004 tsunami, a U.S. official stated, "Frankly, we feel it is a misplaced desire

¹⁹⁷Because foreign direct investment has been highly controversial in India, signaling to investors was likely not a particularly strong motivation.

to demonstrate India's self-importance in the region. If anything, it seems to show the government does not care enough for the people" (Rajghatta 2005).

2004 Flood

In July, heavy monsoon season caused flooding all over southeast Asia, affecting India's states of Assam, Bihar, and Gujarat. India's prime minister set up a task force to address flooding.¹⁹⁸ The federal government released \$43.5 million in relief to Assam.¹⁹⁹ Army helicopters and boats were used to help the relief effort.²⁰⁰ India did not request international assistance.

We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=1**.

2004 Tsunami

After the 2004 tsunami, Prime Minister Singh stated "We feel that we can cope up with the situation on our own" (Kasturi 2013).

After the 2004 tsunami, India's relief efforts were widely criticized, with the UN calling it a "wake-up call" for India's planners, Red Cross officials referring to the relief effort as "chaotic" and a human rights organization in Hong Kong characterizing the relief as "pathetic" (Margesson 2005). Human Rights Watch noted that many groups were discriminated against, such that the relief was also highly inequitable (Margesson 2005). Five years after the tsunami, reports noted that the Indian government failed to deliver on many of its aid promises, and many citizens remain without homes (RT News 2010).

We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=0**.

2005 Flood

Following the 2005 Kashmir floods, which destroyed 2,500 villages in India and displaced five million people, India would accept no aid but provided aid to Pakistan (Krishnan 2014).

After the 2005 flooding in Kashmir, an official of a prominent Indian NGO stated, "The intensity of the calamity could be attributed to poor resource management and lack of planning," and the disaster response included a "near absence of the government's agencies" in the region (Krishnan 2014). A professor of International Studies in Srinagar stated, "There was simply no disaster management...The civil administration simply vanished" (Krishnan 2014).

We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=0**.

2005 Earthquake

The October 8, 2005 earthquake in India of magnitude 7.6 killed 1,300 people and displaced 30,000 families, yet India still refused aid. After the 2005 earthquake, the Indian government insisted it did not need any foreign aid, stating "we ourselves are taking care of our victims" (Sengupta 2005). In fact, India even offered to extend aid to its rival neighbor Pakistan. In a message to Mr Musharraf,

¹⁹⁸http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3909939.stm

¹⁹⁹http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3888953.stm

²⁰⁰http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3535194.stm

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “While parts of India have also suffered from this unexpected natural disaster, we are prepared to extend any assistance with rescue and relief which you may deem appropriate.”²⁰¹ Pakistan accepted the offer. India crossed the Line of Control and helped Pakistani soldiers rebuild their quarters.²⁰² India did also respond at home, sending tents and medical supplies to Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir.²⁰³

We code this case as **reject=4** and **success=1**. We code success as 1 because India successfully addressed the small portion of Kashmir territory in its control while also helping Pakistan.

2006 Flood

Heavy monsoon rains caused flooding in July and August 2006, primarily in the states of Rajasthan and Gujarat. The relief minister of Rajasthan appealed to the central government of India for assistance.²⁰⁴ Military boats and helicopters participated in rescue operations in Rajasthan²⁰⁵ and Gujarat.²⁰⁶ A report from ActionAid indicating that the government’s response was not sufficient in Gujarat, that it had improved very little since the 2005 floods.²⁰⁷ International Red Cross/Red Crescent and other international NGOs contributed in serious ways to the relief effort.²⁰⁸ The government did not request international assistance by August 2,²⁰⁹.

We code this case as **reject=4** because the government did not request assistance. Even though the government did face criticism for its unwillingness to improve its capabilities, there was no international outrage over its rejection of aid, so we code this as **success=1**.

2007 Flood

Heavy monsoon rains affected north India, Bangladesh, and Nepal in July and August. North India was the worst affected of the three countries. Army helicopters were immediately dispatched to help the rescue operation.²¹⁰ Both the government of India and UNICEF set up relief camps in Uttar Pradesh.²¹¹ The government provided \$37 million USD in initial emergency relief.²¹² Oxfam criticized the government of India for poor maintenance of embankments in Bihar.²¹³ In both Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the opposition party made similar claims, stating that the failure of government to address these needs was due to lack of political will, not lack of resources.²¹⁴

²⁰¹http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4321490.stm

²⁰²http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4334590.stm

²⁰³http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4322624.stm

²⁰⁴<http://gulffnews.com/news/asia/india/rajasthan-seeks-rs32b-in-flood-relief-1.251949>

²⁰⁵http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5292308.stm

²⁰⁶http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4779739.stm

²⁰⁷<http://reliefweb.int/report/india/indian-floods-our-response-gujarat>

²⁰⁸<http://reliefweb.int/report/india/india-floods-information-bulletin-no-062006>

²⁰⁹<http://reliefweb.int/report/india/india-floods-ocha-situation-report-no-1-7>

²¹⁰http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6927389.stm

²¹¹http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6929004.stm

²¹²http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6939860.stm

²¹³http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6944661.stm

²¹⁴http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-08-08-south-asia-floods_N.htm

As of late July, the government of India and state governments had provided the main response to the floods, while NGOS – both domestic and international – supported.²¹⁵ India did not ask for international assistance.²¹⁶

We code this case as **reject=4** because the government did not request assistance. Even though the government did face criticism for its unwillingness to improve its capabilities, there was no international outrage over its rejection of aid, so we code this as **success=1**.

2008 Flood

Heavy monsoon rains in August caused severe flooding in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The PM flew over affected areas and promised an aid package of 230 million USD, but angry villagers complained that they did not receive aid or shelter.²¹⁷ The government came under criticism for not having prepared adequately: the Kosi river, the main source of the flooding in 2008, had been changing direction for years but government did not reinforce or relocate embankments. There is some disagreement over whether this was the state or the central government's fault.²¹⁸

India did not ask for international assistance. One reporter stated that there was a strong sense that the government had sufficient resources. However, C Sridhar, the district magistrate in Purnea who oversaw the relief effort there, said "We will certainly welcome international aid particularly those who can offer certain expertise."²¹⁹ According to the UNOCHA FTS, India received almost \$2 million in assistance from the US.²²⁰ This is small in comparison to the size of the government's aid package.

We code this case as **reject=4** because the government did not request monetary assistance. Even though the government did face criticism for its unwillingness to improve its capabilities, there was no international outrage over its rejection of aid, so we code this as **success=1**.

2009 Flood (Monsoon)

Although monsoon rains killed 992 people in July and August 2009, the floods were on a less severe scale than in previous years.²²¹ The government did not ask for international assistance and appeared to handle the flood effectively.²²² We code **reject=4** and **success=1**.

2009 Flood (Unusual rains)

Unlike the floods of the previous few years, this flood was caused by unpredictable rather than monsoon rain. Rainfall in early October was 600 percent of its usual level in Karnataka and

²¹⁵http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/5252F4DAF5127CC84925733200023DC6-Full_Report.pdf

²¹⁶<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/08/23/uk-asia-floods-aid-idUKELK34637420070823>

²¹⁷http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7587368.stm

²¹⁸<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1837449,00.html>

²¹⁹http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7593843.stm

²²⁰https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R24_E15634___1507190300.pdf

²²¹<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/23/india.flood.deaths/index.html?iref=24hours>

²²²in.reuters.com/article/2009/09/15/idINIndia-42475220090915

Andhra Pradesh.²²³ The state government of Andhra Pradesh requested 6000 crore from the central government in interim immediate relief²²⁴ and Karnataka sought 16,500 crore overall.²²⁵ However, AP only received 1000 crore in immediate assistance. The two states joined together to put pressure on the central government.²²⁶ Responding to criticism, PM Singh noted that further aid would come after an appropriate assessment of the damage and that “Money will not be a constraint. I assure people of the State all help from the Centre. We will stand behind the State in this hour of crisis.”²²⁷

The US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer announced \$100,000 in aid to India to help recovery from these floods.²²⁸ This is a small amount in comparison with the relief provided by the government. So we code this case as **reject=4** and **success=1**, since there was no international outrage.

After 2012

After India experienced flooding in Uttarakhand in 2013 in which thousands died, the U.S. and Japan offered aid, but India would not accept the aid (Kasturi 2013). An external affairs ministry spokesperson stated, “As a general policy in case of rescue and relief operations, we have followed the practice that we have adequate ability to respond to emergency requirements” (Kasturi 2013). When Kashmir was flooded in 2014, 150,000 people were displaced and yet India refused help from the United Nations.

Indeed, India is still not prepared for a disaster, according to a 2013 government audit. The audit found that India’s disaster relief agency faces “critical gaps” and is ineffective when responding to disasters (Bhaila 2013). A report by the Comptroller and Auditor General found that the National Disaster Management Authority lacks both information about and control over disaster responses, “none of its mitigation and vulnerability mapping projects was completed”, and it “was found ineffective in its functioning in most of the core areas (Bhaila 2013). Further, “the deficiencies in this regard were not recognized and remedied, especially in terms of deployment or suitable manpower, equipment and training” (Bhaila 2013).

Japan

2011 Tsunami

Japan is frequently hit by massive disasters including tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, typhoons, and volcanic eruptions. Two of the most severe in recent memory were the 1995 Kobe earthquake and

²²³<http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-worst-flood-is-this-climate-change/article1-462047.aspx>

²²⁴<http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/despite-improvement-in-ap-flood-situation-toll-mo-525733/>

²²⁵<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka-turns-focus-on-relief-operations-as-flo/article29698.ece>

²²⁶<http://www.topnews.in/karnataka-andhra-seek-more-flood-aid-2227814>

²²⁷<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rs-1000-cr-advance-central-aid-for-andhra-pradesh/article31566.ece>

²²⁸<http://www.topnews.in/us-announces-100000-aid-indias-flood-victims-2222033>

the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. The magnitude 7.2 that hit on January 17, 1995 earthquake killed 5,200 people, injured 30,000, displaced 300,000 and destroyed 110,000 buildings (Fukushima 1995). The magnitude 9.0 earthquake hit on March 11, 2011, triggering a tsunami which then caused accidents in Japan's reactors, primarily in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. This massive disaster caused an estimated 15,889 deaths, 6,152 injuries, 2,601 missing people, 127,290 collapsed buildings, along with exposure to radiation and evacuation of 30,000 residents living near the plant (CNN 2014; National Police Agency of Japan 2014). The disaster's damage is estimated to cost \$300 billion (CNN 2014).

However, in both cases Japan refused international assistance. After the 1995 earthquake, Japan refused all international offers of help. Further, it took the government months to even recognize the relief efforts of Japanese volunteers (Choate 2011). After the 2011 disaster, while Japan did accept some aid following the earthquake, it did not accept all aid immediately. The chief director of an Israeli NGO stated "it was initially very difficult for the Japanese authorities to accept any kind of outside intervention or support" (Tokyo Weekender 2012). For instance, on March 12, 2011, the Japanese red Cross stated that it had "determined that external assistance is not required, and is therefore not seeking funding or other assistance from donors at this time" (Red Cross of China 2011). Similarly, Reuters reported "Japan's government has received offers for assistance from 91 countries, and has accepted assistance from about 15 based on assessed needs" (Reuters 2011).

Further, once the government did accept some aid in 2011, the Israeli NGO official stated that "most of the places refused our help" once they arrived (Tokyo Weekender 2012). While the government did request aid, its reluctance was magnified after the Fukushima disaster, as it exhibited "reluctance to engage the international community more broadly on Fukushima" (Johnston 2013). For instance, the U.S. offered technical assistance if the nuclear reactors overheated, but the government and the Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO) insisted they could handle the situation themselves. Further, Japan rejected a U.S. offer of cooling fuel rods for the affected nuclear reactors (BBC News 2011). Similarly, a senior U.S. official stated, "We tried to airlift generators to Fukushima right at the beginning, but the Japanese refused our help. They are very proud." He added that they don't have enough "capacity to handle this" (Timmerman 2011).

Many newspapers were very critical; for instance, a 2011 opinion piece written by the president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development stated, "A mixture of pride and arrogance...has led the public and private authorities in Japan to refuse international aid while hiding the scope of the disaster, both from their own people and from the international community...these same officials are refusing the cooperation of foreign experts" (Attali 2011). Indeed, Japan's newspapers downplayed the threat, stating "while higher than normal levels of radiation have been recorded in various parts of Japan, experts and government officials say the figures do not represent levels that could immediately affect human health" (BBC News 2011).

Yet as a wealthy country that does invest in earthquake preparedness, the country could have been conceivably handled the disaster on its own, and indeed, initially following the disaster there was considerable speculation about whether the government had the resources to cope with the disasters (McCurry and Sample 2011). However, after both disasters, Japan faced strong criticism for rejecting aid, as observers agreed that it desperately needed the assistance. The government was very unprepared for the 1995 disaster, experiencing many bureaucratic problems with providing assistance and difficulty coordinating a response (CBC News 2011). It admitted later that it had assumed that Japan was not likely to experience a major earthquake and so had not invested in dis-

aster preparation (Fukushima 1995). It was thus largely unable to respond effectively (Fukushima 1995). The Japanese government was more prepared for the 2011 earthquake and tsunami than it was for the 1995 earthquake due to its enforcement of strict building codes, earthquake drills, information provision, and the installation of a tsunami warning system. However, it was totally unprepared for the possibility of a resulting nuclear disaster (Choate 2011). For instance, after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, many reports concluded that “the crisis is too big for either Tepco or the government to handle” (Johnston 2013).

Japan is a developed country that has consistently sought greater international status. Though its military expenditures have remained relatively constant, staying between around \$45-60 billion since 1988 (Yearbook 2009), this is actually not a very appropriate measure of Japan’s international rise because Japan has fallen under the U.S.’s security umbrella since the end of WWII. More convincing indicators in this case are Japan’s attempt to attain a permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council, which it has declared as its aim since the early 1990s (Coulmas 2006), and its desire to host prominent international events. For example, the 2011 disaster coincided with Japan’s bid to host the Olympics. Reports stated, “many who oppose the Tokyo Olympic bid charge that nobody in the government or the media wants to draw international attention to Fukushima and risk giving the International Olympic Committee an excuse to reject the Japanese bid” (Johnston 2013). For instance, the former Ambassador to Switzerland wrote to Japanese Prime Minister Abe and the U.N. Secretary-General to urge more international assistance with Fukushima and to object to Japan’s Olympic bid stating, “There’s an international strategy to consider that Fukushima did not happen. Japan’s media...has succeeded in creating a ‘business as usual’ atmosphere (Johnston 2013). Japan’s anxiety to be seen as an influential international power contributed to its reluctance to accept aid after the 1995 earthquake, as it was especially hesitant to accept aid “from countries that in their eyes are less developed than Japan” (Fukushima 1995).

Japan’s domestic popularity also was a factor in its decision to reject aid after both disasters, leading domestic media to misrepresent the extent of both disasters (Fukushima 1995). The 1995 earthquake occurred soon after the election of Murayama, who was not very popular (WuDunn 1995); however, his relief efforts became so bungled that he quickly lost support despite rejecting aid and downplaying the extent of the damage (Fukushima 1995). After the 2011 earthquake, the Liberal Democratic Party would not accept aid or even admit to the extent of the disaster until after it won the July 22 2013 election. One day after the victory, the government announced that the Fukushima plant was leaking radioactive groundwater into the Pacific Ocean (Johnston 2013). Further, the government was unpopular, such that reports speculated that “A public perception that it has mismanaged this human tragedy will be its death knell. On the other hand, a responsible and speedy reaction could boost popularity” (Choate 2011).

Finally, investment likely played a role as well. TEPCO and the Japanese government were found to be hiding information and underplaying the scale of the disaster in part to attempt to return to “business as usual” as quickly as possible and protect investors and corporate interests. As one author puts it, “If TEPCO and the government of Japan admit an earthquake can do damage to the reactor, this raises suspicions about the safety of every reactor they run” (Onda 2007). Further, the team responsible for looking into the disaster was “under constant internal and external pressure to downplay the situation and protect the interests of nuclear power” (Chandler 2012). A parliamentarian on the team noted the need for increased help from the U.S. but stated that only industry representatives were talking with the U.S. government (Chandler 2012).

Japan’s human rights scores have been consistently high relative to other countries, though they

fell slightly before both disasters, dropping in 1993, and again around 2010. (Japan's Physical Integrity Index fell from an 8/8 to a 7 in 1993 while its Human Empowerment Index remained at 14/14. The Physical Integrity Index fell to a 6 in 2010 and its Human Empowerment Index fell to a 13 in 2008 and a 12 in 2011 (Cingranelli and Richards 2010).)

Analysts pointed to both international and domestic consequences if the government failed to respond effectively, stating, "If Tokyo fails to address the crisis forcefully and effectively...the country will emerge from this disaster with its international powers curtailed, its confidence impaired, and its finances further damaged. The tendency of the world to view Japan as a spent force would thus be confirmed" (Madsen 2011). Yet it seems that because the government could not provide effective responses, it tried to hide the extent of the disaster to create the illusion of them.

Even though the Japanese government did accept some aid, we code this case as **reject=4** because the government at multiple times was so resistant to foreign interference. Because this resistance was widely criticized by the international community, we code **success=0**.

U.S.

2005 Hurricane

Hurricane Katrina, which formed on August 23, 2005 and dissipated by August 31, 2005, killed 1,833 people in the U.S., particularly in Louisiana, displaced a million people, and caused \$108 billion of damage.

While the U.S. had the resources to be prepared for and to deal with the disaster, it was not prepared and did not handle it well. The hurricane surge protection in New Orleans failed and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was widely held to be incompetent and unresponsive. President Bush's declared state of emergency did not encompass any of Louisiana's coastal counties, many private facilities waited too long to evacuate and were unable to do so, and looting and violence were widespread following the disaster. The National Guard was sent in to try to restore order. Inadequate planning and insufficient back-up communication systems were reported, and claims of mismanagement were widespread. FEMA and the Red Cross "did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to fully support the massive number of Gulf coast victims." [[wikipedia]]

In response, around seventy countries offered international assistance; however, the U.S. rejected all but 4.7% of it. The U.S. is the world's superpower, with the largest military spending in the world, a seat on the UNSC, and nuclear weapons, and thus sought to signal its status to the international community. Accepting aid would have represented a hit to this image. Thus, one reason the U.S. rejected assistance is thought to be "the potential political fallout from asking foreign nations to help the world's greatest power save lives on its own turf." An NGO official said it would have been "a tremendous admission of failure"

The U.S. also wanted to signal domestically that it had the disaster under control. President Bush's approval ratings had been steadily declining since the September 11th disaster and he wanted to signal his competence to the citizens.

While the United States has high human rights ratings, they fell while Bush was president, falling from a 7/8 in 2000 to a 4/8 in 2004-5 on the physical integrity index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). (The Human Empowerment Index stayed at a consistent 12/14.) Indeed, Bush

stayed at his Texas ranch on vacation during the crisis.

2011 Flood

During April and May, heavy rains caused the Mississippi river to swell. The flood that resulted rivaled the Mississippi floods of 1927 and 1993. The same storm system in April also produced a deadly tornado. Between the floods and the tornado, about 350 died. The floods caused widespread evacuation of floodplains in Mississippi, Missouri, Alabama, Louisiana, and Tennessee.

President Obama declared a federal disaster area in affected states. One of the main actors in the response was the US Army Corps of Engineers, which opened floodplains on three separate occasions to avoid flooding major cities.²²⁹ The American Red Cross handled evacuations. The National Flood Insurance program, managed by FEMA, compensated victims whose houses were damaged or washed away.²³⁰

The Army Corps faced some criticism for encouraging cultivation in floodplains and underestimating the frequency of extreme flooding along the Mississippi.²³¹

The US did not appeal for international assistance and did not receive any offers of international assistance.

Myanmar

2008 Cyclone

Cyclone Nargis, categorized as “very severe,” hit Myanmar on May 2, 2008, leading to a storm surge that killed at least 138,000 people. The damage from the cyclone was estimated to cost \$10 billion. Myanmar announced it would not accept aid following the disaster. Many countries sent aid anyway, which was refused at the ports (Steele 2013). Because Myanmar was so ill-equipped to deal with the disaster, the international community debated whether to force it to accept aid. They feared a “second catastrophe” due to disease and poor conditions” (BBC News 2008*a*). Eventually, due to these threats and pressure, Myanmar eventually accepted limited aid, but still demanded that it control its distribution (Farley 2008).

Myanmar tried to downplay the extent of the disaster, claiming on May 7 that everything was “returning to normal” when it was very clear that the disaster was far from over. Three weeks later, it claimed that it had stopped relief efforts and had begun reconstruction. These claims led to further international criticism (Selth 2008, 388).

Myanmar is a small state without a lot of investment, so its foreign aid rejection was not likely a signal to the international or investor communities, particularly since it was clear to them that the government could not handle the disaster. However, while it was clear to the international community that the government was not prepared for the disaster, it was not clear to the domestic population. The government thus likely rejected aid to signal its competence to its citizens. The

²²⁹<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-13401894>

²³⁰http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/mississippi-river-flooding-what-happened-2011/05/16/AFMXg44G_blog.html

²³¹<http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/17/17greenwire-once-rare-mississippi-river-flooding-2011/05/17/17greenwire-once-rare-mississippi-river-flooding.html?pagewanted=all>

government's popularity was fragile, as it had experienced large protests a year earlier, in 2007. These led to larger unrest, which ended with a government crackdown. In response to the protests, the government had both become sensitive to outside intervention, and had decided to draft a new constitution. It claimed the constitution would implement democratic reforms, but it also would provide the military with total control over its own management and provide immunity for members of the junta. A referendum to approve the constitution was scheduled for a week after the cyclone hit, and the government decided to go ahead with it despite the cyclone (Selth 2008).. The government was thus especially sensitive to public opinion at this time.

Werker (2010) states that officials did not simply accept aid because they "were worried that they would lose legitimacy in the eyes of their population." For instance, the government tried to hide other information from the people, as well. Many relief organizations and international bodies stated that the death toll was over-reported because the government stopped counting to minimize the political damage (CTF 2009). The government worried that the presence of foreign aid workers would undermine the regime's control over information about the disaster, since it would "undermine the regime's efforts strictly to control what its citizens see, hear and, as far as possible, think...the provision of clearly identifiable foreign aid packages would emphasize the regime's own failure to provide assistance, and the country's relative lack of development" (Selth 2008, 391). Note, however, that in this case the outcome may have been overdetermined since the regime also feared that accepting foreign aid could increase the risk of an invasion (Selth 2008).

Myanmar also did not care much about human rights, scoring 0/8 on CIRI's physical integrity index and 0/14 on human empowerment index in 2007. In 2008, it received the same physical integrity index score, and only moved to a 1/14 on the human empowerment index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Many foreign leaders attributed Myanmar's foreign aid rejection to a lack of concern for its citizens. For instance, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called it "inhuman treatment," and many others made similar statements (BBC News 2008*b*).

Turkey

2011 Earthquake

In 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 7.2 hit the city of Van, followed by severe aftershocks, killing 604 and injuring 4,152 people Turkey initially issues a statement saying that the aid was not needed (Ravid 2011). However, the shortage of shelter grew so great that they triggered protests and Turkey was forced to accept aid by the end of the week (Seibert 2011).

Turkey was not prepared, though it could have been. However, for Turkey to be earthquake prepared, it would need to rebuild 10% and repair 30% of its homes (Dombey 2011). A prominent Turkish writer said "we should not blame the earthquake but the people who cheated on the construction and the municipalities that did not enforce the regulations" (Dombey 2011). An earthquake tax that was supposed to assist with disaster readiness went to other construction projects instead (Dombey 2011). Turkey thus has "poor building practices and lax enforcement of quality codes" (Peterson 2011).

However, Turkey initially rejected aid because, according to a Turkish writer and communist, it "didn't want to create the impression that Turkey was in need of assistance from abroad, this was not in the interest of a country that is emerging as a regional player" (Dombey 2011). Indeed, just

before the earthquake, Turkey's newspaper, *Today's Zaman* reported that "The events of the Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a weakened Iran have left a window of opportunity for this once-dormant power to reemerge as the leader of the Middle East" (Myers 2011). The *Montreal Gazette* reported that Turkey was exercising this influence through its involvement in Syria, military exercises, and sanctions (Myers 2011). The economy tripled over the last decade.

This decision was also likely the result of domestic politics. Analysts have concluded that it "could stem more from a desire to be seen as a strong power or result of domestic politics" (Jayasinghe and Sevin 2013). Even after international aid was allowed, political fighting over aid distribution continued, as the ruling party and the pro-Kurdish party accused each other of trying to take credit for the aid distribution (The Economist 2011). Such a motivation would be similar as the reason for its rejection of aid after its large 1999 earthquake. After that earthquake, it rejected aid from many groups, especially pro-Islamic groups because "that could be seen as weakening the prestige and authority of the state" (Kinzer 1999).

Turkey's human rights record is not great, as it scored a 2/8 physical integrity index and a 7/14 on the human empowerment index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010).

Yet Turkey was forced to relent and accept aid after protests erupted over the handling of the disaster. Turkey's prime minister Erdogan admitted the government made a mistake in rejecting aid (Dombey 2011).

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